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A Preference for Liberty: The Case
Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered
Stephen J. Morset
In the last two decades there have been changes of immense magnitude in the laws pertaining to involuntary commitment of mental patients to hospitals.' In 1960, involuntary mental hospitalization and
treatment were decisions almost entirely within the discretion of mental
health professionals. Although, at least in theory, commitment had to
be accomplished in conformity with statutory requirements, effective
substantive and procedural restraints on families and mental health
professionals who sought involuntary commitment were virtually nonexistent. Moreover, the degree of power and discretion vested in
mental health professionals was not considered problematic-it seemed
fitting to allow medical personnel to make what were viewed as essen-

tially medical decisions.
In the mid-1960's, however, the picture changed radically. Lawyers interested in civil rights turned their attention to involuntary hospitalization at the same time that various conceptual and political
critiques of psychiatry, especially institutional psychiatry, gathered mot Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center, and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, University of Southern California School of Medicine. A.B.
1966, Tufts University; J.D. 1970, Ph.D. (Psychology and Social Relations) 1973, Harvard
University.
This Article was presented at the 6th International Symposium on Law and Psych/iatry held in
Charlottesville, Virginia in June 198 1, under the auspices of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and
Public Policy of the University of Virginia School of Law and School of Medicine. In an earlier
form, it was presented at the Biennial Convention of the American Psychology-Law Society held
at the University of Maryland School of Law in October 1979.
In modified form, this Article will appear as a chapter in C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST
RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW,

Press, and in my forthcoming book,
Oxford University Press.

to be published in 1982 by the University of Chicago

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CRAZINESS,

to be published by the

Paul Chodoff, Len Kaplan, John Monahan, David Rosenhan, Serena Stier, and David Weisstub are due grateful thanks for providing perceptive and helpful, if not always assenting, comments on earlier drafts. I should also like to thank my various research assistants, Joan Mussoff,
Jan Harris, Peg Casey, and Maureen Lee, for their help.
I. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See generally D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW:
MAJOR ISSUES

11-57 (1981).
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mentum.2 In addition, the theory of community mental health and the

wide usage of psychotropic drugs appeared to render long term involuntary hospitalization less advised and less necessary.
The legal watersheds were California's Lanterman-Petris-Short

Act (LPS)3 in 1967, and the 1973 Wisconsin federal district court decision, Lessard v. Schmidt,4 both of which limited the state's power to

commit persons involuntarily. Following LPS, the majority of states
legislatively reformed commitment laws;5 following Lessard,numerous
cases found state commitment laws unconstitutional and applied stringent substantive and procedural due process protections to the involuntary commitment process. 6 Most recently, as courts have faced a new

generation of issues concerning mental patients' rights, there has been
an expansion of the right of involuntary patients to refuse treatment.7

The balance between individual liberty and autonomy on the one
hand, and the state's paternalistic right to confine and treat persons involuntarily on the other, has clearly shifted to a preference for liberty.

The "legalization" ' of commitment has occasioned an enormous
and all too often dismaying debate. Exchanges have been marred by
charges and countercharges that are overblown and unfair.9 Involuntary commitment and the actors in the system are portrayed in polar
terms of good and evil. Proponents of legalization are accused of lacking compassion or of not understanding clinical realities. Many mental
health professionals are outraged by what they view as the legal system's wrongheaded interference with their ability to practice properly.
2. See, e.g., R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967); R.D. LAING & ANTI-PSYCHIATRY (R. Boyers & R. Orrill eds. 1971); T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T.

SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974).

3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West 1972) (effective July 1, 1969).
4. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacatedand remanded on proceduralgrounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974), newjudgment entered, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded,421 U.S. 957 (1975) (for reconsideration in light of Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592 (1975)), reafd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
5. Schwitzgebel, Survey of State Commitment Statutes, in CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL
POLICY 47, 53 (A. McGarry et aL. eds. 1981); e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 1-37 (West

Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1-.28 (1979 Cum. Supp.).
6. E.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
7. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), modjfed, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 101 S.Ct. 1972 (1981); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978),
modified andremanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). But see A.E. & R.R. v. Mitchell, 5 MENTAL
DISAB. L. RPTR. 154 (D. Utah 1980).
8. This term is used to describe the increased involvement of the legal system through the
imposition of substantive and procedural restraints. Since the legal system's involvement in invol-

untary commitment has been almost uniformly for the purpose of restricting commitment and
protecting patients' rights, "legalization," as used in this Article, more particularly describes the
limitation of involuntary commitment through the imposition of legal restraints.

9. Rather than contribute to the overheated atmosphere by citing offenders, except when
using direct quotations I shall assume that readers could easily call to mind specific examples of
the phenomena I am describing.
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They believe that, on balance, patients have been harmed by legalization, and they have described the outcome as patients "dying with their
rights on,"' 0 and having "the right to rot."" These professionals concede that there have been abuses in commitment practices and hospital
conditions in the past, but they believe that legalization is an unwise
remedy and that it certainly has gone too far. Conversely, proponents
of medical authority are indicted for being unconcerned with liberty
and dignity and for acting in bad faith; well-meaning mental health
professionals are labeled jailers or worse.
To buttress their positions, advocates find or hypothesize apparently clear cases that seem to make difficult issues easily resolvable.
While such cases arouse sympathy or anger, they do not stimulate sensible discussion. It is relatively simple to find or construct "easy" cases,
but doing so is an injustice to the enormous social, moral, and legal
complexity of the question of involuntary hospitalization. Comparatively few actual cases are so extreme that most reasonable persons
would agree that involunitary hospitalization was or was not warranted.' 2 Furthermore, society would not create a complex and expensive system of involuntary commitment to deal with the few cases of
extreme craziness and disability that undeniably could warrant the
need for involuntary hospitalization, nor would society abolish such a
system to avoid a few clear cases of "railroading" normal persons into
hospitals.
All those concerned with the involuntary commitment debate
should recognize that most proponents of commitment are not unconcerned with the liberty of those affected and that most proponents of
legalization or abolition of commitment are not lacking in compassion
or concern for citizens who are disordered and apparently unable to
cope successfully in our society. Name calling should cease. Moreover, advocates should no longer use unrepresentative cases to support
their positions. Such evidence produces both poor social science and
unsound bases for sensible social policy. What should be clear is that
there is no ideal solution to the personal, family, and social problems
associated with mental disorder. Maintaining, abolishing, or severely
limiting involuntary commitment all have costs and benefits for disordered persons and society at large. What is needed is reasonable and
realistic analysis of the likely outcomes of various approaches.
10. Treffert, The PracticalgimitsofPatients'Rights,in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROcEss: DIAGNOSIS & DEBATE 227, 227 (R. Bonnie ed. 1977).
11. Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Hosfpital Case: 'InvoluntaryMind Control' the
Constitution and the "Right to Rot,' 137 AM. J. PSYCHAT. 720, 723 (1980).
12. This is especially true, I believe, if the necessity for hospitalization is considered in a
context where decent alternative treatment programs are available.

1982]

INVOL UNTAR Y COMMITMENT

The purpose of this Article is to offer a reasonable policy argument
in favor of abolishing or severely limiting involuntary commitment of
the mentally disordered. Constitutional arguments will not be
presented. Although an argument that involuntary commitment is unconstitutional can be constructed, it would be unpersuasive and probably incorrect. The goal here is to persuade that involuntary
commitment is a3 gravely unwise social institution, regardless of its
constitutionality.1
It must be acknowledged at the outset that some clearly avoidable
harm will come to individuals and to society if the positions taken in
this Article are adopted as social policy. It must also be acknowledged
that a reasonable and coherent case can be made for maintaining involuntary commitment and for extending the authority of mental health
professionals within the system. Nevertheless, this Article concludes
that, on balance, our society, the mentally disordered, and even the
mental health professions will be better off without involuntary commitment. At a time when many argue that legalization has gone too
far, this Article argues that it has not gone far enough.
To support these conclusions, Part I will consider the assumptions,
evidence, and arguments concerning involuntary hospitalization. Following that, Part II will examine the paternalistic commitment reforms
suggested by Alan Stone and Loren Roth to see if they avoid the
problems of the current system. Lastly, Part III will discuss the benefits
that will follow from abolishing or severely limiting involuntary hospitalization. Although this Article hopes to persuade by this effort--or at
least to help shift the burden of persuasion to the proponents of involuntary commitment-it will have achieved its primary purpose if it
demonstrates that a reasonable and compassionate argument can be
made for abolition of involuntary commitment and helps place the
commitment debate on a more realistic and reasoned basis.
13. Because the basis of the argument is not grounded in constitutional law, it should be
understood that the meanings of terms like "liberty" and "fundamental rights" as used in this

Article are not coextensive with their meanings as declared by the Supreme Court.
Throughout most of the Article, discussion will focus on abolition in order to set forth the
views most starkly. It should be understood, however, that the arguments may also be used to
support extensive limitations on involuntary commitment.
On occasion, support for various propositions will refer to cases or other materials dealing
with the mentally retarded. The arguments of this Article, however, apply only to the mentally
disordered, and such support will be employed only where the situations of the mentally retarded
and the mentally disordered are reasonably analogous.

Finally, the case presented applies only to adults. I believe the case against committing minors is even stronger, but the issues are sufficiently different to require separate consideration.
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I
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

Involuntary commitment is an extraordinary exercise of the police
power and paternalism of the state. Although liberty is constantly infringed in various ways by state action-preventive detention through
certain bail practices is but one example-the deprivation of liberty authorized by involuntary commitment laws is among the most serious
restrictions on individual freedom the state may impose. Moreover, it
may be imposed on the basis of predictions, without the prior occurrence of dangerous acts or other legally relevant behavior. Typically,
the state must have exceptionally weighty interests in order to justify
such an exceptional deprivation of individual freedom. It must therefore be asked whether, in light of our national preference for liberty, a
system of involuntary commitment that is based on wide substantive
standards and relatively lax procedures can be justified. It is argued in
this Part that it cannot.
The objections to involuntary civil commitment are both theoretical and practical. First, it is difficult or impossible to support, with the4
ory or data, the differential treatment of mentally disordered persons'
that allows them, but not normal persons, to be involuntarily committed. Second, the system is unlikely to identify accurately those persons
14. It is impossible to provide a noncontroversial generic definition of mental disorder. The
American Psychiatric Association admits as much in its currently operative and authoritative DiAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited

as DSM-III], but then provides the following "conceptual" influences on the decision to categorize
a "condition" as a mental disorder in DSM-III:
In DSM-III each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or a pattern that occurs in an individual and that is
typically associated with either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or
more important areas of functioning (disability). In addition, there is an inference that
there is a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction, and that the disturbance is
not only in the relationship between the individual and society. (When the disturbance
is limited to a conflict between an individual and society, this may represent social deviance, which may or may not be commendable, but is not by itself a mental disorder.)
In DSM-III there is no assumption that each mental disorder is a discrete entity
with sharp boundaries (discontinuity) between it and other mental disorders, as well as
between it and No Mental Disorder.
Id. at 6.
I have argued previously that the categories of mental disorders all describe behavior that is
considered crazy, meaning inexplicably irrational, weird, wild, nonsensical, or the like. The severity of mental disorder, according to this view, is simply a reflection of the degree of craziness
exhibited by the actor. I prefer the term crazy because for legal purposes it is more descriptive and
carries fewer connotations about disease processes that beg important questions about self-control.
The full argument is presented in Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 543-60 (1978).
In this Article the terms mental disorder and craziness as described in this note will be used
interchangeably. Of course, the Article is concerned primarily with those crazy persons who are
hospitalized involuntarily, and it should be recognized that these persons are usually those considered severely crazy or mentally disordered. See note 55 infra.
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who should arguably be committed; consequently, large numbers of
persons who are not properly committable will be unjustly and needlessly deprived of their liberty. Third, it is unlikely that the states will
be able to provide the quality of care and treatment for those committed that is absolutely necessary to justify the enormous deprivation of
liberty caused by commitment. Finally, most, and probably all, of the
alleged benefits of involuntary hospitalization can be provided by less
intrusive alternatives that are equally efficacious but cause much less
deprivation of liberty.
-4. Mentally DisorderedPersons Should Not Be Legally
DistinguishableFrom Normal Persons
The primary theoretical reason for allowing involuntary commitment of only the mentally disordered is the belief that their legally rele5
vant behavior is the inexorable product of uncontrollable disorder,'
whereas the legally relevant behavior of normal persons is the product
of free choice. It is believed, for example, that a normal person who
experiences an impulse to commit a crime is capable of repenting or
being deterred by the sanctions of the criminal law, 16 and hence, may
choose not to commit the crime. Thus, to preserve the person's autonomy and dignity, a normal person cannot be incarcerated until he or
she actually offends the criminal law, even if the person's future dangerousness is highly predictable. 7 On the other hand, the disordered
person is thought to lack understanding or behavioral control, and
therefore cannot change his or her mind or be deterred. 8 Because the
individual will ultimately have little or no choice in deciding whether
to act violently, it does not violate the disordered person's dignity or
autonomy to hospitalize him or her preventively, even in the absence of
strong predictive evidence of future dangerousness.
The belief that disordered persons particularly lack competence or
behavioral control is a strongly ingrained social dogma that underlies
the special legal treatment accorded mentally disordered persons. 19
But what is the basis for this belief? A major distinguishing aspect of
most behavior labeled serious mental disorder is that it is inexplicably
irrational-it is crazy behavior that makes little or no sense to others.20
15. Developments, supra note 1, at 1212; see generally Wear, MentalIllness and MoralStatus,
5 J. MED. & PHIL. 292 (1980).
16. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 470, 210 A.2d 193, 202 (1965); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972).
17. In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (rent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
19. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 9-11 (1967).
20.

H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

199-239 (1979); Fingarette, Disabilitiesof Mind and CriminalResponsibility-4

Unitary Doctrine,
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When a person behaves in such a way, there is a tendency to believe
that the person is out of control.2 ' After all, who, in his right mind,
would choose to act crazily? 22 Thus, when we cannot make sense of the
behavior of another, we believe that there is something wrong with the
person, something beyond the actor's control in most cases.2 3 For example, if a patient tells us that he will not take his medicine because the
doctor is a hostile agent trying to poison him, we are likely to believe
the patient is mentally disordered-the reason for drug refusal is delusional, after all-and that this refusal of treatment is incompetent because it is the product of the delusion and not of the patient's free,
rational choice.
But the assertion that the crazy behavior of mentally disordered
persons is compelled, in contrast to the freely chosen behavior of normal persons, is a belief that rests on commonsense intuitions and not on
scientific evidence.24 Indeed, the degree of lack of behavioral control
necessary to justify involuntary commitment is fundamentally a moral,
social, and legal question-not a scientific one.25 Social and behavioral
76 COLUM. L. REv. 236, 248-52 (1976); Moore, Some Myths about "MentalIllness,'32 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIAT. 1483, 1496 (1975).
21. Rabkin, Opinions About Mental Illness.- .4 Review ofthe Literature, 77 PSYCHOL. BULL.
153, 158-59 (1972); Sarbin & Mancuso, Failureof a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public To.
ward Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 159, 159 (1970).
22. If, however, so acting led to a beneficial result, then choosing to act crazily would no
longer seem uncontrollable, irrational, or crazy. For example, consider the case of a criminal
defendant who feigns insanity to avoid conviction. This was apparently the ploy used by Ezra
Pound, aided and abetted by certain psychiatrists, to avoid trial, conviction, and possible execution for treason after the Second World War. Torrey, The ProtectionofEzra Pound,PSYCHOL.
TODAY, Nov. 1981, at 57.
23. See Morse, Crazy Behavior,Morals, and Science: An Analysis ofMental Health Law, 51
S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 531 (1978).
24. Id. at 553, 559-89.
25. In another context, the author has analyzed this question as follows:
Law is a normative enterprise that treats nearly all persons in all situations as responsible for their acts and often for the natural and probable consequences of those acts. In
most cases the law adheres to the commonsense and subjectively experienced view that
behavior is a matter of choice: it is the actor's act. Nevertheless, the law acknowledges
that all persons are subjected to various biological, psychological, and sociocultural factors or pressures that affect their choices of action. All such factors affect choices, making some choices easy and some hard. As a result, the law recognizes that some
behavioral choices may be too hard to serve as the basis for the imposition of legal
responsibility ....
While acknowledging that some choices are so hard that it is inappropriate for society to ascribe responsibility for them to the actor, the legal system allows few exceptions
to the rule that persons are causally and legally responsible for their behavior. But
which choices are too hard?. . . There is no bright line between free and unfree choices.
Harder and easier choices are arranged along a continuum of choice: there is no scientifically dictated cutting point where legal and moral responsibility begins or ends. Nor is
there a higher moral authority which can tell society where to draw the line. All society
can do is to determine the cutting point that comports with our collective sense of morality. The real issue is where society ought to draw the line of responsibility-and by
whom it should be drawn.
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scientists can only provide information about the pressures affecting an
actor's freedom of choice. The law must determine for itself when the
actor is no longer to be treated as autonomous.26
In fact, empirical evidence bearing on the question of the control
capacity of mentally disordered persons would seem to indicate that
mentally disordered persons have a great deal of control over their
crazy behavior and legally relevant behavior related to it;27 indeed,
often they may have as much control over their behavior as normal
persons do.2" Even in apparently easy cases where it seems clear that
the legally relevant behavior is the product of mental disorder-for example, the delusional person who refuses needed medication or attacks
the doctor because he believes the doctor is a hostile agent-we cannot
be sure that the person is incapable, as opposed to unwilling, to behave
rationally or to control him or herself. All that is certain is that the
person did not behave rationally compared to dominant social
standards.
For comparison, imagine the case of a habitually hot-tempered
person who takes offense at something his doctor says and threatens to
harm the doctor. Is this person more in control or rational than the
delusional person? Or, consider the case of a severely ill cardiac patient who refuses to modify dietary, exercise, or smoking habits because
the person prefers his or her habitually unhealthy lifestyle. The person's behavior can disrupt the well-being of the family, help drive up
health care and insurance costs, and, if the result is an untimely death,
impoverish the family. Is this person more in control or rational than
the delusional person, and if so, in what sense? Of course, we all "understand" the behavior of the hot-tempered person and the cardiac patient, while the behavior of the delusional person makes no sense
whatsoever. Still, there is no conclusive means to prove that any of
these persons has greater or lesser control than any of the others. Despite this, civil commitment is possible only for the delusional person;
the hot-tempered person may be detained only after striking or atMorse, supra note 23, at 562 (quoting Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: . Reply to
Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1253 (1976)).
The central question for our inquiry, then, is whether the choice to behave in legally relevant

ways is too hard a choice for society fairly to ascribe moral and legal responsibility to actors whose
legally relevant behavior seems caused by craziness.

26. Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WAsH. L. REV. 735 (1973); Suarez, 4 Critique of the Psychiatrist'sRole as Expert Witness, 12 J. FOR. Sd. 172 (1967); Szasz, Psychiatric
Expert Testimon-Its Covert Meaning and Social Function, 20 PSYCHIAT. 313, 315-16 (1957);
Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of CriminalResponsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 386
(1952). See generally Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
27. Morse, supra note 23, at 561. Empirical data cannot, however, dispose of the conceptual
problem of whether persons have free will. J. MACKIE, Emics 203-08 (1977).
28. Morse, supra note 23, at 576.
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tempting to strike the doctor and the cardiac patient cannot be forced
to enter a hospital or to change his or her lifestyle.
There is thus little support for the proposition that the mentally
disordered, in contrast with normal persons, lack the ability to control
their behavior. The mere intuition that the mentally disordered lack
control should not be sufficient to deprive such persons of their freedom. A system of involuntary commitment for only disordered persons
disordered's
therefore cannot be justified on the basis of the mentally
29

alleged lack of free choice or capability for rationality.
A second possible reason that only crazy persons may be committed is the belief that they are especially dangerous.30 If so, society
might be justified in instituting special measures that would make it
particularly easy to intervene in the lives of crazy persons for either
their own good or the good of society. This argument, however, may
be disposed of with relative ease. Mental disorder is both an over and
underinclusive predictor of dangerousness; most crazy persons are not
dangerous and many normal persons are.3 '
Indeed, although it is hard to obtain firm data on this question,
mentally disordered persons are probably no more dangerous than normal persons.3 2 At one point it was believed that mentally disordered

persons were especially prone to violence, but later empirical studies
29. I am not suggesting, of course, that all mentally disordered persons are capable of reasonable rationality and self-control; such a claim would ignore reality. Nevertheless, because the
capability for rationality and self-control is distributed along a continuum, most disordered persons meet the low threshold in these capacities necessary for freedom from involuntary state intrusion in a society that so highly values liberty. Moreover, many people not considered mentally
disordered repeatedly behave in ways that are most harmful to themselves and society. Although
such behavior is attributed to character or weakness or some other cause not based on mental
disorder, the intuition is that this behavior also is out of control. Yet only those labeled mentally
disordered can be massively deprived of their liberty by involuntary hospitalization. The language and conceptual apparatus of the disorder or disease concept is the primary support for this
distinction, but in fact the labels are conclusions about alleged lack of control, not proof of it.
The intuitive hunch that the mentally disordered lack control is insufficient support for the
system of involuntary civil commitment that distinguishes our examples of the delusional, hottempered, and physically ill persons. If mentally disordered persons have significant control over
their lives and are reasonably capable of rationality, and if it appears-labels of disorder asidethat many normal persons substantially lack these capacities, then the disordered are largely indistinguishable from other citizens in these respects. Consequently, they should not be treated differently to their disadvantage in terms of their freedom from confinement and freedom to live their
lives as they choose.
30. Cocozza & Steadman, The FailureofPsychiatricPredictionsoDangerousness Clearand
Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1087-88 (1976); Sarbin & Mancuso, supra note
21.
31. Rappeport, The Problem of the Dangerousness of the Mentally I11, in THE CLINICAL
EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 3, 4 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967).
32. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il/- PracticalGuides and
Constitutionallmperatives,70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1124 (1972); Diamond, The PsychiatricPredction ofDangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 444 (1974); Gulevich & Bourne, Mental Illness and
Violence, in VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE 309, 313 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula & F.
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tended to support the opposite conclusion, which in turn became the
accepted wisdom for many years.33 In the last few years, however, a
series of studies has tended to show that ex-mental hospital patients
have higher arrest (not conviction) rates than nonpatients. 34 Such findings have led some to conclude that mentally disordered persons may
be especially dangerous. But close analysis of the data reveals that
prior arrest rather than mental status is the variable that accounts for
the recently increased arrest rates among mental patients-patients are
now more likely to have been previously arrested than formerly.35
Moreover, ninety percent of ex-patients are not arrested. 36 In sum,
mental patients are not especially dangerous, and, if they are slightly
more dangerous than nonpatients, it is not a consequence of their
mental disorders. 37 Finally, the mentally disordered account for much
less violence in absolute terms than normal persons. Therefore, if social safety is a primary goal of involuntary hospitalization, it will not be
served by singling out the mentally disordered.
A third reason given for allowing commitment of only the mentally disordered is that such persons are especially incompetent, that is,
incapable of rationally deciding what is in their own best interests. 38
The concept of incompetence is difficult to analyze, but it is clear that it
refers to an inability to decide rationally or to manage one's life, rather
than to the fact that the individual in question makes decisions that
might be considered irrational or based upon seemingly irrational reasons. In order to protect liberty and autonomy, the legal system focuses
on the decisionmaking process rather than decisional outcomes:39 so
Ochberg eds. 1970); Steadman & Keveles, The Community4djustment and CriminalActivity of the
Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 304, 308, 310 (1972).
33. Brill & Malzberg, CriminalActsofEx-Mental HospitalPatients,AM. PSYCHIAT. ASSOC.
MHS, Supp. 153 (1962); Rappeport, Lassen & Hay, .4 Review ofthe Literatureon the Dangerousness fthe Mentally 11, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 72, 74-76 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967).
34. Rabkin, CriminalBehaviorof DischargedMental Patients:A Critical,4ppraisalfthe Research, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 21 (1979).
35. Steadman, Vanderwyst & Ribner, Comparing4rrest Rates of MentalPatientsand Criminal Offenders, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1218, 1218 (1978). But see Sosowsky, Explaining the Increased,4rrestRate4mong MentalPatients:.4 CautionaryNote, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1602,.1603-

04 (1980).
36. Rabkin, supra note 34, at 26.
37. Morse, supra note 23, at 540, 581, 631. But see Sosowsky, supra note 35. See generally
Monahan & Splane, PsychologicalApproachesto CriminalBehavior,in 2 CRIMINOLOGY REV. Y.B.
17, 36-39 (E. Bittner & S. Messinger eds. 1980).
38. Morse, supra note 23, at 632-34; Developments, supra note 1, at 1208.

39. Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 430-32, 434 (D.C. Utah 1979);
Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Just'FcationforCivil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75,
88 (1968). Of course, process and outcome cannot always be so neatly separated. Process only

becomes significant, typically, in cases where an outcome or series of outcomes seems unduly
irrational. Moreover, it will often be assumed that the process must have been irrational if an
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long as a person is capable of rational decisionmaking and managing,
the person will be left free to make irrational decisions or to mismanage his or her life and to suffer the consequences; 4 only if the person is
not so capable does overriding the actor's judgment and substituting
the judgment of the state appear justified. Of course, a person who
consistently demonstrates bad judgment or gives apparently irrational
reasons for his or her decisions is often assessed as being incapable of
exercising sound judgment, at least in particular areas of his or her life.
Nevertheless, it is generally believed that unless the person is crazy, he
or she is probably capable of deciding rationally, even if most of the
evidence is to the contrary.4 '
Are the mentally disordered particularly incompetent? The question is crucial because involuntary commitment substitutes the state's
judgment about the necessity for hospitalization (and often for treatment as well) for the judgment of the individual. Although commitment rarely includes a formal finding of legal incompetence at present,
it at least implies the judgment that in some cases the person cannot
cope or make decisions in his or her own best interest.42 Indeed, the
commitment schemes proposed by Alan Stone and Loren Roth place
crucial weight on a person's decisionmaking competence.43
There is, however, little empirical or theoretical justification for
the belief that the mentally disordered as a class are especially incapable of managing their lives or deciding for themselves what is in their
own best interests.' Available empirical evidence demonstrates that
the mentally disordered as a class are probably not more incompetent
than normal persons as a class. 45 Indeed, there is no necessary relationship between mental disorder and legal incompetence.46 As it was with
irrational decision is reached, even though the individual may be able to provide an apparently

rational explanation for the behavior.
40. Morse, supra note 23, at 632-34.
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 815, 323 N.E.2d 294, 297 (1975).
42. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 32-34 (1968). Contra, Vecehione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(recognizing that mental disorder does not necessarily imply incompetence), 426 F. Supp. 1297

(E.D. Pa. 1977), 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom. Beal v. Vecchione, 434 U.S. 943
(1977).
43. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM INTRANSITION 66-76 (1975); see text
accompanying notes 145-60 infra.
44. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361 (D. Mass. 1979), modoed on appeal, 634
F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), cer. granted,101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131,
1145 (D.N.J. 1978), modpfed and remanded,653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
45. Buttiglieri, Woodson, Guenette & Thomson, DriverAccidents andthe Neuropsychlatric
Patient, 33 J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 381, 381; Howard, The Ex-Mental Patientas an Employee: An On-the-Job Evaluation, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiAT. 479 (1975); Tolor, Kelly & Stebbins, Altruism in PsychiatricPatients: How Socially Concernedare the Emotionally Disturbed?,44
J. CONSULT. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 503, 506 (1976).
46. Morse, supra note 23, at 540-41, 632-34.
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dangerousness, mental disorder is an over and underinclusive indicator: many normal persons are incompetent 47 and many, if not most,
mentally disordered persons are not.48 Consequently, the premise of
the commitment system that crazy people are particularly incompetent
is unsupported. While some disordered persons are clearly incompetent according to any reasonable criteria, the social goal of reducing the
consequences of incompetence is not well-served by allowing involuntary hospitalization, guardianship, or treatment of only the mentally
disordered.
A final reason for allowing commitment of only mentally disordered persons is the belief that they are especially treatable. 49 The
mental disorders themselves and the dangerous and incompetent behaviors that allegedly ensue from mental disorder supposedly are particularly ameliorable by mental health treatment methods. Although
this assertion seems reasonable, once again there is little evidence to
support it.50 There is every reason to believe that normal persons who
are dangerous or incompetent are equally treatable. 5 Indeed, there is
good reason to believe that normality is positively correlated with likelihood of treatment success. 52 Moreover, the consequent social disabilities, which are in many cases more worrisome than mental health
53
symptoms, are far harder to treat than the symptoms themselves.
Differential treatability is thus not a supportable rationale for allowing
involuntary commitment of the mentally disordered.
These comments on the lack of self-control, dangerousness, incompetence, and treatability of the mentally disordered do not imply that
no seriously mentally disordered person lacks self-control or is dangerous or incompetent as a result of his mental disorder; nor do they mean
that the disordered are per se untreatable. A person who is assaultive
47. One in Five Adults Lack BasicLiving Skills, Study Finds, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, § X,
at 1, col. 1.
48. See THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 251-52 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock

1971).
49. But cf. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An EnchantingLegal Fiction?,36 U. CHI. L. REv.
755, 762 (196 ) (involuntary treatment not therapeutically effective).
50. A. STONE, supra note 43, at 36-37; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 39, at 86;
May, When, What and Why? Psychopharmacotherapyand Other Treatmentsin Schizophrenia, 17
COMP. PSYCHIAT. 683 (1976). See generally DuBose, Ofthe ParensPatriaeCommitment Powerand
Drug Treatmentof Schizophreni" Do the Benefts to the PatientJustiyInvoluntary Treatment?, 60
MINN. L. REv. 1149, 1167-209 (1976).

51.

Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 39, at 86.

52.

J. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING 188-89 (rev. ed. 1974); W. SCHOFIELD, PSYCHO-

THERAPY: THE PURCHASE OF FRIENDSHIP 128-35 (1964).

53. May, supra note 50, at 689; See also White & Bennett, TrainingPsychiatricResidents in
Chronic Care, 32 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 339, 339 (1981). Social disabilities refer, for example, to a person's lack of skills to manage personal care or finances, to obtain medical care, to hold
a job, or simply to learn to behave reasonably appropriately in social situations.
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because of delusions is of course dangerous. And although lack of self-

control and incompetence are hard to assess, in some cases a commonsense determination that a crazy person lacks control or is incompetent
can be made. Finally, many mentally disordered persons are of course
treatable with some likelihood of success. Both data and theory indicate, however, that the mentally disordered as a class are not particu-

larly lacking in the capability for self-control and rationality, nor are
they particularly dangerous, incompetent, or treatable. There would
thus seem to be little support for an involuntary commitment system
that is imposed only on the mentally disordered. 54 Such a system will
neither protect society nor protect large numbers of persons from themselves with special efficacy. What such a system will do is cause large
numbers of citizens to lose their liberty based on faulty premises that
rob them of dignity.
At the very least the analysis offered in this section should suggest
that if involuntary commitment of only the mentally disordered can be
justified at all, it should be limited to cases of persons who, first, are so
clearly crazy that all reasonable persons would agree that their capability for self-control or rationality fails to pass even the lowest of legal
54. One answer is that perhaps normals, too, should be involuntarily committed if they behave in the legally relevant ways that now in part support involuntary hospitalization. This answer is consistent with the case I have suggested. But instituting a broad preventive detention
scheme applicable to all citizens would constitute a vast shift in the relative power of the state
versus the individual, and it would be an extraordinary infringement on liberty in our society.
Nor is such a scheme consistent with historical, constitutional, and social values. See Dershowitz,
The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law, 43 U. CIN. L. Rav. 781 (1974);
Johnson, The Role ofPenalQuarantinein Reducing Violent Crime, 24 CRuME & DELINQ. 465, 474-

80 (1978). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (Japanese relocation cases).
55. Morse, supra note 23, at 653.
It may be objected at this point that the argument is reasonable when applied to all persons
who may be labelled mentally disordered according to the criteria of DSM-III; after all, many of
the categories refer to behavior that is hardly very crazy according to anyone's definition. But the
persons who are involuntarily hospitalized are typically very crazy indeed, and it appears that
their capacity for self-control or rationality is far removed from that of the average noncrazy or
mildly crazy citizen. It is admittedly difficult to make any sense of severely crazy behavior in a
large number of instances, and it is hard to believe that very crazy persons have any control over
such craziness and its further behavioral consequences. Yet it is clear, for instance, that delusional
people do not always act on their delusions and that in most ways very crazy people act just like
normal persons. Moreover, many seemingly normal persons seem fixed in irrational and repetitive behavior patterns that are destructive of their health, happiness, and welfare. Even if such
normal persons can give reasons for their self-destructive behavior that make some sense, it is
hard to believe that these reasons are not rationalizations or that these persons would continue so
to act if they could help it. In sum, the argument that the mentally disordered do not specially
lack self-control is less intuitively persuasive when it is applied to very crazy persons, but this does
not vitiate its conceptual and empirical underpinnings. In any case, if the argument fails when
applied to the subclass of severely crazy persons, then the law should only apply to them. Of
course, present civil commitment statutes are not so limited.
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thresholds;56 second, are so dangerous or incompetent, as demonstrated
by objective acts, that preventive confinement is clearly and absolutely
necessary to prevent grave harm; and, third, are clearly and only treatable on an inpatient basis. Only in such cases can singling out the mentally disordered for involuntary hospitalization be reasonably justified
on theoretical and utilitarian grounds.
B. The Involuntary Commitment System Will Produce Unacceptable
Numbers of Improper Commitments
Proponents of commitment often concede that in the past the commitment net ensnared many persons who did not need to be committed.
But, they argue, there are persons for whom involuntary commitment is
truly appropriate. Involuntary commitment, therefore, should be properly limited rather than abolished. 58 In that way, the excesses of the
past will be avoided, the system will operate fairly, and the small
amount of liberty sacrificed will be justified by the benefits flowing to
society and those committed. This argument has plausibility and appeal if one accepts, as many do, that the mentally disordered are different enough to warrant a commitment system applicable only to them
and that proper limitation of involuntary commitment is possible. This
section challenges the latter assumption and argues that it is highly unlikely that the involuntary commitment system will operate so as to
commit only properly committable persons and that, to the contrary,
unjustifiably high overcommitment will necessarily result from the
existence of any commitment system that applies only to the mentally
disordered.
One factor that is likely to lead to the overuse of civil commitment
is the use of commitment as a mechanism for the control of "overflow"
deviance. As a social control system, involuntary commitment provides a solution to the problems caused by troublesome, annoying,
scary, and weird persons. 59 Even if such people are not particularly
harmful to themselves or others, they often disrupt-frequently se56. It should be clear that a diagnosis of mental disorder would not be helpful in assessing
this criterion. The question would be whether the person's thoughts, feelings, and actions are so

crazy that the assumption about lack of capacity for self-control is clearly reasonable. Morse,
supra note 23, at 559.
57. There are, of course, also nondisordered persons who meet these three criteria, but here I
am accepting, for the sake of argument, the threshold distinction between disordered and nondis-

ordered persons.
58. Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 111, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 496, 497 (1976).

59. K.

MILLER, MANAGING MADNESS:

THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL COMMITMENT

129-31

(1976); Rachlin, Pam & Milton, Civil Liberties versus Involuntary Hospitalization, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 189, 190-91 (1975); see Lamb, Sorkin & Zusman, Legislating Social Controlofthe MentallyIll in California, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 334, 338 (1981).
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verely-their families, friends, colleagues, and the public. In short,
they tend to cause interpersonal problems and to make those around
them feel profoundly uncomfortable. The criminal justice system may
be unable to control this type of deviance because in many instances
the deviant behavior may not constitute a crime.6 0 Still, the severity of
social disruption and nuisance is undeniable. Involuntary commitment
thus satisfies a perceived need to have an alternative system to deal
with this type of conduct.
Family and interpersonal problems and the discomfort of others,
however, are not sufficient reasons in a free and pluralistic society to
deprive people involuntarily of their liberty: the right of people not to
be bothered is important, but it is far less weighty than the right of the
bothersome person to be free.6 Nor will it do to say that we must have
commitment for such cases because society will insist on it. To date,
few of the "horribles" predicted by opponents of enhanced rights for
the disordered have occurred as a result of greater freedom for the disordered. Society has tolerated and can manage to tolerate crazy behavior without resort to incarceration.
Although limited involuntary commitment laws seek to avoid undue incarceration, the social pressure to incarcerate troublesome, crazy
62
deviants is so powerful that such laws are likely to be misapplied.
People who do not fit the commitment criteria will be held to do so,
and the system will continue to sweep into hospitals persons who are
capable of living freely without significant danger to themselves or
others. Civil commitment is such a simple, although unfair, answer to
interpersonal, family, and comparatively mild social problems that it is
63
certain to be overused.
Another factor that increases the likelihood of improper overcommitment is the difficulty attending proper conceptualization and diagnosis of mental disorder. There is much disagreement among mental
60. Monahan, Caldeira & Friedlander, Police andthe Mental i111. A Comparisonof Commit.
ted andArrestedPersons,2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHiAT. 509, 513 (1979) (only 30% of persons committed were technically arrestable); Warren, The Social Constructions o/Dangerousness,8 URB. LIFE
359 (1979). But cf. Dickey, Incompetency and the NondangerousMentally I// Client, 16 CRIM. L.
BULL. 22, 29 (1980) (disruptive behavior should not be excused in attempting to understand the
problems of the mentally ill).
61. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). Moreover, it is worth emphasizing

that the vast majority of social nuisance and disruption is caused by persons who are not sufficiently disordered to be committable.
62. See sources cited at notes 111-12 infra; cf. Dickey, supra note 60, at 36 (need to do
something about troublesome behavior leads to use of incompetency commitment where civil

commitment is barred). It is also worth noting that more generally powerless persons, such as
blacks and the aged, tend to be disproportionately committed. Tomelleri, Lakshminarayanan &
Heranic, Who are the 'Committed?, 165 J. NERV. & MENT. DisEAs 288 (1977).
63. K. MILLER, supra note 59.
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health professionals about how to define and categorize disorders.'

Further, there are those who go so far as to claim that mental disorder
does not exist, that a medical model of deviant behavior is misguided
and perhaps dangerous. 5 A common theme in many of the criticisms
of the medical model is that it is far too easy to declare any deviant

behavior to be the symptom of a disorder, thus bringing that behavior

within the ambit of the commitment system. 6

The debate about the medical model and the proper conceptualization of crazy behavior has been intense for at least two decades and
shows little sign of abating.67 At present, a more medical view seems to
have regained its ascendency within the psychiatric profession.6 8 Nevertheless, the problems associated with the medical model cannot be

gainsaid by discoveries of biological causes for some disordered behaviors or by the apparently clear success of some somatic treatments, most
notably chemotherapies, in reducing crazy behaviors in significant
numbers of patients.6 9 The controversy concerning the medical model

will not disappear, and indeed, it will probably reappear with renewed
intensity with the almost inevitable failure of the new biological psychiatry to fulfill the lofty hopes it has engendered. And so long as the

debate is unresolved, the group with the power to define disorders will
retain the ability to overinclude deviant behaviors as mental
disorders.7"
Even if one accepts the validity of the medical model as a reasonable working model, a related but seemingly decreasing problem is that

of diagnostic reliability. Prior to the promulgation of the most recent
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-II1), 7 1 it was fair to claim on

the basis of the research evidence that the reliability of diagnoses of
64. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and The Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 697 (1974); Goleman, Who's Mentally 111?, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Jan. 1978 at 34-35; R. SPITZER & D. KLEIN, Defnition of LabelingandMental Illness, in CRITICAL
ISSUES IN PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 1 (1978).
65. T. SzAsz, supra note 2; T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970). See also T.
SARBIN & J. MANCUSO, SCHIZOPHRENIA: MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR MORAL VERDICT? (1980).
66. Morse, supra note 23, at 560; Schwitzgebel, supra note 5, at 50.
67. See, ag., T. SARBIN & J. MANCUSO, supra note 65; J. WING, REASONING ABOUT MADNESS 140-66 (1978).
68. Psychiatry'sFocus Turns to Biology, L. A. Times, July 21, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (morning
final ed.).
69. Morse, supra note 23, at 564-72.
70. The classic historical instance was the debate centered in the American Psychiatric Association over whether homosexual behavior per se was a mental disorder. After intense lobbying
by gay rights groups and sympathetic elements within the A.P.A., the organization held a referendum to decide whether homosexuality was a mental disorder. As a result of that vote, behavior
that was formerly viewed as a disorder was relabeled normal. For a chronicle of this extraordinary event, see R. BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DiAGNOSIS (1981).

71.

DSM-III, supra note 14.
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mental disorders, including those considered the most severe, often
failed to rise over fifty percent when measured by independent rater
agreement.72 However, unlike the categories of DSM-1,7 3 those of
DSM-III are relatively precisely defined and include specific inclusion

and exclusion criteria. Consequently and unsurprisingly, the initial
field trials of DSM-III have demonstrated far higher reliability than
most previous studies. For example, in the second stage of the DSMIII field trials, the reliability coefficients (kappa) for schizophrenia,
major affective disorders, and organic brain syndrome-the disorders
that are diagnosed in the major proportion of hospitalized patientswere .81, .80, and .76 respectively. 74 Accordingly, there is at least some

reason for optimism about the possibility of achieving reasonable accuracy on the threshold involuntary commitment criterion-the presence
of mental disorder.

Despite the theoretical possibility of high diagnostic reliability un72. Spitzer & Fleiss, A Re-analysis of the Reliabiliy ofPsychiatric Diagnosis, 125 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIAT. 341, 344 (1974). This was the case even when the study used clinicians from a major
psychiatric research center and precise research diagnostic criteria. Helzer, Clayton, Pambakian,
Reich, Woodruff & Revely, Reliabiliy of PsychaitricDiagnosis: I. The Test/Retest Relabili of
Diagnostic Class/fcation, 34 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 136, 139 (1977) (the coefficient of agreement
(kappa) for depression was .55, for schizophrenia, .58, and for organic brain syndrome, .29).
73.

AMERICAN PSYCHIAT. Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
74. DSM-III, supra note 14, at 470.
75. A. STONE, supra note 43. Despite the initial favorable findings on the reliability of DSMIII, caution is nonetheless warranted before it can be ultimately concluded either that DSM-11
diagnoses are highly reliable or that such higher reliability will even partially solve the overcommitment problem. There are questions one may raise about the field trials. The experimenterdiagnosticians in the field trials were completely self-selected. The principal investigators advertised for field testers in the PsychiatricNews, the American Psychiatric Association newspaper that
reaches the entire membership, and in other mental health publications. Of the 20,000-30,000
psychiatrists reached by these advertisements, 365 volunteered to participate and all were accepted. It is virtually certain, therefore, that the field testers were more interested in diagnostic
accuracy than the average practitioner and correspondingly were unusually careful in their diagnostic work during the field trials. Moreover, although the methodological instructions to the
numerous diagnosticians were filled with instructions and admonitions to avoid biased case selection and to maintain rater independence, there was no ongoing direct supervision by the project
staff over the groups carrying out the trials. The fullest description of the field trials is DSM-III,
supra note 14, at 467-68 (citing other descriptions as well). Although the description is not clear
on this point, a member of the project staff confirmed that the cases were not selected according to
an agreed, randomized procedure, but instead were selected on a "catch as catch can" basis at the
various centers performing the field trials (apparently the field testers did not exercise a systematically biased selection procedure either). Telephone conversation with Steven Hyler, M.D., Columbia University, Nov. 4, 1981. Furthermore, the enormous increase in reliability over the
Helzer study, supra note 72, seems difficult to explain because, as noted, the Helzer study used
both explicit research criteria and, presumably, highly motivated diagnosticians from a major
research center. The American Psychiatric Association is to be commended for trying to test
DSM-I11 fairly, but one may appropriately wonder if the reliability figures would have been so
high if all the field trials used random cases and were carefully controlled and supervised. Moreover, it is not at all clear that, even if the field trials are accurate, the application of DSM-111 in
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der DSM-III, it is unlikely that its detailed guidelines will effectively

prevent overcommitment. The very high reliability achieved under
controlled research conditions may not be able to be matched by diag-

nosticians in the hurly-burly of everyday practice; caution is warranted
until the results of reliability studies of the general use of DSM-111 are

available. Furthermore, the diagnostic criteria of DSM-II are still
sufficiently vague to allow a diagnostician with biases for hospitalization or treatment to fit a large number of persons into the most serious
categories.76 Moreover, many persons who may legitimately be given a
severe diagnosis may still not be sufficiently crazy to warrant involun-

tary hospitalization. Thus, although it is reasonable to be optimistic
about the benefits of DSM-111, its use is by no means a guarantee

against overcommitment.
Even if the mental health professional is able to diagnose mental
disorder accurately, the problem of the legal system's treatment of that
diagnosis remains. Mental illness or disorder is often not defined for
legal purposes.7 7 Will all conditions called mental disorder support involuntary commitment (if the behavioral component is also met), or
should only severe mental disorder be sufficient? If only severe disorgeneral practice will be equally reliable. For a thorough critique of the reliability of DSM-II, see
J. ZISKIN, I COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 138-44 (3d ed. 1981).
Moreover, although the diagnostic entities of DSM-III may be more reliable than their predecessors, there is still reason to question whether the new entities are valid. A psychiatric disorder
is said to be valid if it is distinguishable from other disorders not only by its facial criteria, but also
by its course, family patterns, pathophysiology, specific treatment response, and the like. Feighner, Robins, Guze, Woodruff, Winokur & Munoz, Diagnostic Criteriafor Use in PsychiatricResearch, 26 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 57, 57 (1972) (for the vast majority of psychiatric disorders,

there are no conclusive anatomical or chemical signs to validate the presence of a disorder). To
date, in my view and the view of others, substantial research evidence for the validity of most
DSM-III categories is lacking. See Overall & Hollister, ComparativeEvaluation of Research Diagnostic CriteriaforSchizophrenia,36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 1198, 1198 (1979); Reply by Overall

and Hollister to Letter to the Editor, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 1382 (1979); J. ZISKIN, sUpra, at
137-38.
76. See DSM-III, supra note 14, at 6:
Another misconception is that all individuals described as having the same mental disorder are alike in all important ways. Although all the individuals described as having the
same mental disorder show at least the defining features of disorder, they may well differ
in other important ways that may affect clinical management and outcome.
For example, note that persons diagnosed "schizophrenic" according to DSM-III, id. at 181-93,
may exhibit quite different behaviors depending -on which subtype of schizophrenia the individual
allegedly has. (It may be noted, too, that.despite the wide differences in the criteria for the different subtypes, the field test reliability figure of .81 was calculated on the basis of agreement about
any form of schizophrenia.) Simple inspection of the criteria for schizophrenia and its subtypes
discloses that there are few precise quantitative criteria, and thus a given person with schizophrenia, as intimated above, "may well differ in other important ways," such as the overall degree of
craziness and social disability evidenced by the person.
77. See, eg., Lelos, Courtroom Observation Study of Civil Commitment, in CIVIL COMMIT-

MENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 102, 103-04 (A. McGarry et al. eds. 1978) (study of application of
statute in Massachusetts).
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der is sufficient for legal commitment purposes, how is severity defined
78
and who should decide which disorders fit the category of "severe"?
A third basis for the belief that commitment criteria will be overapplied is that the relevant behavioral component standards are too
vague and require predictions that are beyond the present capability of
mental health professionals or anyone else. Standards such as "dangerousness" or "need for hospitalization" have no generally agreed upon
meaning among lay persons or professionals.79 Of course, there is
likely to be a great deal of agreement about extreme cases, 0 but such
cases are unusual. Thus, it may be claimed, each witness, lay or professional, along with each factfinder, injects his or her own private meaning into the criteria, rendering the system essentially lawless.
It would be possible to ameliorate such vagueness by rewriting the
criteria to allow commitment only if rather specific behavioral criteria
were met.8 ' For instance, the dangerousness criterion might be written
78. See A. STONE, supra note 43, at 47, 48; Stier & Stoebe, InvoluntaryHospitalizationof the
Mentally I// in Iowa: The Failureof the 1975 Legislation, 64 IowA L. REv. 1284, 1382 (1979).
There are undeniably serious problems with a "medical model" of disordered behavior, with
diagnostic reliability in psychiatry, and with the legal definition of mental disorder. These
problems, however, need not unduly undermine the proper workability of a commitment system.
To the extent the law continues to rely on mental health categories to answer legal questions, such
as who should be committed involuntarily, it remains at the mercy of the vagaries, unreliability,
and internecine disputes of mental health science. Once freed from such reliance, identification of
the mentally disordered becomes less problematic. I submit that for involuntary commitment
purposes the law is seeking to identify those persons who seem so severely disturbed, so crazy, that
the intuition about the lack of behavioral control appears justified. Even if there are conceptual
problems with the concept "mental disorder," there are certainly some people who behave so
inexplicably irrationally, so crazily, that society is perhaps warranted in believing that something
is "wrong" with such persons. Identification of these persons, rather than being a scientific matter,
requires a social, moral, and legal assessment that these people are fit subjects for preventive
detention because they behave in an inexplicably irrational manner betokening lack of fundamental autonomy. Morse, supra note 23, at 553; but cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)
(discussing standard for burden of proof in commitment proceedings). If the legal identification
of mental disorder were placed on this common sense social basis, fewer "incorrect" legal decisions would result and the liberty of citizens would not depend on the particular diagnostic theories and skills of the testifying mental health professionals. Morse, supra note 23, at 560. This
solution, however, would not be a panacea. Judges and juries might still differ widely about who
is sufficiently crazy and overcommitment could still result. But the system would be asking the
proper questions, and over time a relatively clear legal standard of severe disorders might develop.
79. Menzies, Webster & Butler, Perceptions of Dangerousnessamong ForensicPsychiatrists,
22 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIAT. 389, 391 (1981) (the "striking feature" of the responses of forensic
psychiatrists to a questionnaire asking them to define dangerousness "was the wide variability of
perceptions of dangerousness"); Simon & Cockerham, Civil Commitment, Burden of Proof,and
Dangerous.4cts: 4 Comparison of the PerspectivesofJudges and Psychiatrists,5 J. PSYCHIAT. L.
571, 573-74 (1977); see Schwitzgebel, Treatment andPolicy Considerations,in CIVIL COMMITMENT
AND SOCIAL POLICY 25, 33 (A. McGarry et. al eds. 1981); Stier & Stoeber, supra note 78, at 138590.
80. Simon & Cockerham, supra note 79, at 588-90.
81. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976); cf. Goldstein & Katz,
DangerousnessandMentalIllness, Some Observationson the Decision to Release PersonsAcquitted
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and interpreted to mean only substantial physical danger-for example, death or serious bodily harm to oneself or others as evidenced by a
recent (e.g., within the past seven days) act or attempt. While such a
standard is no more vague than many substantive criminal law criteria,
a few observations are in order. In a free society, preventive detention
should be authorized, if at all, only for serious harms. Additionally,
persons whose dangerousness is evidenced by acts or attempts can be
removed from society by the criminal justice system. However, if dangerousness is evidenced only by a threat (or less), the question of the
predictability of real harm, discussed in detail below," is raised." Finally, there is the fundamental question of whether it is the proper role
of the state to intervene massively in the life of an individual to prevent
the person from doing harm to him or herself. Thus, philosophical and
political objections to paternalistic commitment are not resolved by developing more precisely defined criteria that refer to relatively specific
behaviors. Although less vague criteria ensure that the system will operate more fairly, the system's foundation remains unsound.
When commitment laws authorize preventive detention, predictions of future behavior are almost always required. For example,
commitment criteria often require that the person is "likely" to be a
danger to self or others. 4 On occasion no qualifying phrase referring
to probability will be found, and a person may be committed if he or
she is simply "dangerous to others. ' '85 There are two related problems
with these criteria: first, it is rarely if ever clear what specific
probability of the requisite harms is required; 6 and, second, only poor
predictive ability exists.
The former difficulty could be remedied by more precise statutory
specification of the probability required. What probability of harm is
required (and which harms are required) is a political, legal, and constitutional question. It is clear, however, that in a free society there
should be a high probability of the occurrence of the harm prior to any
preventive detention.87 But how high is sufficient?8" If "likely" or similar standards are interpreted to mean 51% probability, this will mean
by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE LJ. 225, 235-39 (discussing criteria for commitment following a
defendant's acquittal by reason of insanity). See generalo Fuller, Two PrinciplesoflHumanAsso iation, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 3 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969).

82. See text accompanying notes 90-96 infra.
83. A. STONE, supra note 43, at 29; Stier & Stoebe, supra note 78, at 1384-85; Note, Overt
DangerousBehavior as a ConstitutionalRequirementforInvoluntary Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally 11, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 562, 584-85 (1977).
84. Eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1 (West 1979).
85. Schwitzgebel, supra note 5, at 50-51; see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & I4ST. CODE § 5250 (West

Supp. 1981).
86. Schwitzgebel, supra note 5, at 51.
87.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975).
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that persons may be incarcerated when there is just slightly more than a
50-50 chance that they will actually cause the specified harms. Assuming that the probability data are accurate, it is therefore possible that
just under half the people committed will not pose the requisite danger
in fact. This number of wrongly committed "false positives" is completely unjustified in a society that values liberty. Most informed persons would probably agree that the "correct" probability required for
preventive detention is much higher, say, in excess of 80%. But even
then, it should be noted, one person in five will be unnecessarily committed. It might be argued that the probability of harm required and
the degree of harm required should be inversely related: the greater the
harm predicted, the lower the probability of its occurrence that is required.8 9 But if such an inverse sliding scale were permissible, the
probability of harm required for even great harms should still be quite
high.
Even if the predictive criteria are defined more clearly and at a
sufficiently high probability level, there is little evidence that future legally relevant behavior, especially in the long term, can be accurately
predicted by anyone9" except in a few clear cases. Most cases will not
be clear and many false predictions will result. Indeed, studies of the
prediction of violence to others demonstrate that an accuracy rate of
30-40% is unusually high. 91 For predictions of suicide, an accuracy rate
of about 20% appears to be the upper limit of present predictive skill. 2
Of course, if the probability of harm required for commitment is lowered enough, fewer improper commitments will ensue. But, since most
persons would probably agree that preventive detention should not be
authorized on the basis of a low probability of harm, the prediction
problem cannot be solved in this fashion.
88. See, ag., McGarry & Schwitzgebel, Introduction, in CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL
POLICY 1, 5-6 (A. McGarry et al. eds. 1978); Schwitzgebel, supra note 5.
89. Monahan & Wexler, A Defiite Maybe: Proofand Probabilityin Civil Commitment, 2
LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37, 38-39 (1978); cf. Genego, Goldberger & Jackson, ParoleRelease
DecisionMfaking andtheSentencing Process,84 YALE L.J. 810, 872-76 (1975) (arguing that similar
salient factor scale used in parole decisions is constitutional in spite of high error).
90. Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 30; Diamond, supra note 32; Monahan, PredictionResearch andthe Emergency Commitment ofDangerousMentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135
AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 198 (1978).
91. Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 17 (J. Monahan ed. 1976). Accuracy rates of under 10% are not uncommon. The American Psychiatric Association has admitted that psychiatrists are poor predictors of
long range violent behavior. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association at 1416, Estelle v. Smith, 101 S.Ct. 1866 (1981).
92. Mackinnon & Farberow, An Assessment of the Utility of Suicide Prevention, 6 SUICIDE
AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 86 (1976); see Pierce, The Predictive Validation of a Suicide
lntent Scale. A Five Year Follow-up, 139 BRIT. J. PSYCHIAT. 391 (1981) (considerably lower accuracy, even when predicting clearest cases).
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The problem is particularly acute in the involuntary commitment
context where the increased use of dangerousness criteria has amplified

the necessity for relying on predictions to make commitment decisions.
Many false predictions appear inevitable, and it is virtually certain that

there will be many more false positives than false negatives since
mental health professionals tend to err in the direction of overpredict-

ing rather than underpredicting legally relevant behavior.93 For many
reasons, professionals are more likely incorrectly to believe that harm

will occur or that involuntary treatment in a closed institution is neces-

sary than incorrectly to believe the opposite.9 4 As a result, lack of pre-

dictive accuracy leads far more often to incorrect commitment than to
incorrect release. The improper incarceration of a vast number of hapless citizens who safely could and properly should remain at liberty is

the unfortunate result.
Inaccurate predictions create a powerful objection to involuntary
93.

J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44-50 (1981); Fagin,

The Policy Implications of Predictive Decision-making: 'Likelihood'and 'Dangerousness'in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 24 PUB. POLICY 491, 511-14 (1979); Monahan, supra note 91, at 20-21;
McGarry & Schwitzgebel, supra note 88, at 4; Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigmfor Exploring
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOL. 224, 227-28 (1978); Wenk, Robison &
Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?, 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 393, 398-402 (1972); H.
Steadman, The StatisticalPredictionof Volent Behavior: Measuring the Costs ofa Public Protectionist versus a Civil Libertarian Model, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAV.---(in press). As Steadman's paper
points out, this will be true whether one adopts a basically libertarian or control model for deciding whom to commit; see Menzies, Webster & Butler, supra note 79, at 394 (despite wide variability in psychiatric definitions of dangerousness and other criticisms of the utility of the
dangerousness concept, forensic psychiatrists "were still confident in their capacity to utilize the
concept in an accurate and socially valuable manner").
A possible caveat to the negative assessment of predictive accuracy is necessary when considering predictions of short term behavior based on immediately past behavior. John Monahan has
suggested that predictive accuracy in such situations is likely to be quite good and therefore
should not vitiate the propriety of short term emergency commitment. Monahan, supra note 90.
This suggestion is plausible and sensible, but to date there is almost no research on the question
and one study that might seem to support it was insufficiently controlled. Rofman, Askinazi &
Fant, The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior in Emergency Civil Commitment, 137 Am. J.
PSYCHIAT. 1061 (1980).
Even if Professor Monahan is correct, his thesis still does not make strong inroads in the case
against involuntary commitment. First, if the emergency situation involves harm to others, the
behavior will properly invoke the criminal justice system. I and others, e.g., A. STONE, supra note
43, at 36-37, 70, consider that the most appropriate system to deal with such behavior. The other
major type of emergency situation where predictions may be reasonably accurate will be cases of
acute, active, and clear suicidal actions. If short term emergency commitment is allowed in response to such cases, this would create only a possibility for very limited involuntary commitment.
These cases will also meet the three clear criteria for ever justifying commitment discussed at
notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. In any event, most predictions are not made in such
clear cases. Finally, Professor Monahan's suggestion does not apply to release decisions.
94. Dershowitz, Psychiatryin the LegalProcess: .4 Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 32-33
(1968); cf. Scheff, DecisionRules, Types ofError and Their Consequencesin MedicalDiagnosis,8
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 97 (1963) (physicians "too often place patients in the 'sick role' who could
otherwise have continued in their normal pursuits.").
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commitment because a society with a strong preference for liberty
should seek to minimize incorrect involuntary commitments, even at
the risk of increasing the number of "incorrect" rejections of commitment.95 The analogue to the criminal justice system, of course, is that
our society does "not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is
guilty."' 96 Until predictive accuracy becomes immeasurably greater,
the involuntary civil commitment system will result in unacceptable
numbers of unjust commitments.
A final reason that overcommitment is inevitable is the procedural
laxness that apparently characterizes commitment proceedings nearly
everywhere, including those jurisdictions where the law requires rather
stringent protections. Hearings tend to be perfunctory, rarely applying
fully the procedural protections required; there is not a reasonably
complete exploration of either the factual basis for commitment or the
possibility of less restrictive placements. 97 Furthermore, since appeals
are infrequent, judges are left relatively free to apply substantive criteria too loosely and to fail to insist on the requisite procedural safeguards. Most importantly, the lawyers who represent the allegedly
mentally disordered often fail to act in a fully adversary manner, even
when trained to do so. 98 Finally, although the standard of proof required for involuntary commitment under the Constitution is stricter
than the civil preponderance standard, 99 it creates a much higher risk
commitment than the criminal standard of "reasonable
of wrongful
doubt. ,,loo
95. But cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979) (standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings can be lower than that required for conviction in criminal cases).
96. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 373 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. See State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977); sources
cited in notes 111-12, 185 infra;studies cited in Morse, supra note 23, at 536 n.16. See also Luckey
& Berman, Effects of a New Commitment Law on Involuntary Admissions and Service Utilization
Patterns,3 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 149, 159 (1979) (raising the burden of persuasion in commitment
cases did not change the commitment rate, suggesting that the burden of persuasion was not being
strictly applied).
98. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment.- Training Attorneys to Cope With
Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1, 8-12 (1978).

99. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
100. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Many civil commitment cases have required the reasonable doubt standard, e.g., Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent procedural history set forth in note 4
supra); Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979); Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 372 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1978). Critics
of the reasonable doubt standard have claimed that the standard is so high that it would be impossible to commit anyone. But such criticism confuses the probability of harm required to commit
with the burden of persuasion necessary to prove that probability. Monahan & Wexler, supra
note 89. It is also contradicted by the experience of jurisdictions where the reasonable doubt
standard applies. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt,
1976 Wis. L. REV. 503, 508.
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It is sometimes argued, by those who are aware of the overcommitment danger, that the problem is not serious. Even if some persons are
wrongly committed because they are not significantly dangerous to
themselves or others, it is contended, these persons probably are mentally disordered and will therefore benefit from a regime of hospital
care and treatment.' 0 This argument must fail for at least two reasons.
First, society has decided that provision of treatment does not outweigh
liberty interests in those cases that do not meet the statutory criteria for
commitment; wrongful commitment is unjustified, abusive, and stigmatizing even if treatment is provided.' 2 Second, as discussed in greater
detail in the next section, state mental hospitals (and many private hospitals) are unlikely to provide quality care and treatment, even to those
who arguably need it the most.'0 3
It is also claimed by some that professional review and the concern
of family and friends are effective buffers against erroneous commitment. This argument was made by the United States Supreme Court in
Addington v. Texas in support of its holding that the Constitution did
not require a standard of proof for involuntary commitment as high as
the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 1" This line of
reasoning is stunningly mistaken, however. Truly adequate professional review or care is a rarity in the public hospital system (and in
some private hospitals),10 5 and, as much research demonstrates, commitment often occurs in cases where the person to be committed has no
family or friends. 0 6 Moreover, where families and friends exist, they
are usually only too glad to have the bothersome person removed from
circulation. 0 7 The checks on erroneous commitment suggested by the
Supreme Court simply do not exist to a substantial degree.
The Court observed further inAddington that a person debilitated
by mental disorder already suffers from stigma and diminished liberty
101. A good fact situation on which this type of argument might be based is presented by In
re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 231 S.E. 633 (1977). Ms. Hatley was evidently clearly disordered, but her
proven dangerous behavior was merely careless backing up of her automobile. On appeal, Ms.
Hatley was released. This case is also a good example of the use of involuntary hospitalization to
remove a difficult and perhaps disruptive family member.
102. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975).
103. See text accompanying notes 115-35 infra.
104. The Court noted that a standard higher than the civil (preponderance) standard was
required because civil commitment involved substantial liberty interests and stigma. 441 U.S. 418,
431-32 (1979).
105. See text accompanying notes 121-25 infra.
106. C. Warren, The Court of Last Resort: Mental Illness and the Law 259-61 (unpub. manuscript, to be published in 1982 by U. Chicago Press). See also Lelos, supra note 77, at 152-53.
107. Indeed, one highly respected mental health court judge once confided to me that he was
always willing to rule against commitment if family or friends would come to court and indicate a
willingness to care for the allegedly committable person. Unfortunately, this rarely occurred.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:54

by reason of the disorder.1 08 Therefore, the Court naively concluded,
"it cannot be said that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go
free' than for a normal person to be committed."' 0 9 In a word, erroneous commitment is serious, but it is not a grave social error. Such a
belief is sadly mistaken. It is true that a severely disordered person is
stigmatized to some degree and has restricted life choices in the community. However, it is no less true that involuntary hospitalization is a
further extraordinary restriction on liberty that should be avoided at all
costs. Moreover, in many cases, an increase in stigma also results: until a person is hospitalized involuntarily, there is no authoritative public
labeling and recording that the person is mentally sick. Hospitalization
is an unfortunate outcome for almost any citizen and is egregiously
harmful for those who do not meet the statutory criteria for commitment. The Court's argument is astonishing; only by ignoring or mischaracterizing the social circumstances of those committed, the vast
overcommitment that now occurs, the quality of the public (and many
private) hospitals, and the consequences of hospitalization, can it be so
cavalier about wrongful commitment and about the balance of state
and individual interests.
In sum, for a variety of reasons-the desire to control deviance,
difficulties in the proper definition and diagnosis of mental disorder,
vagueness of commitment standards, difficulties in accurately predicting future behavior, and procedural laxity-the involuntary civil commitment system will produce unacceptably high numbers of improper
commitments and thus will continue to function as an unjust system.
This will be true even in those jurisdictions that have reformed their
commitment statutes in an attempt to limit their application only to
those persons who allegedly truly require involuntary
0
hospitalization. 1"
The claim that a high likelihood of overcommitment is inevitable
is supported by empirical studies of the application of reformed commitment statutes.I' Careful studies demonstrate that as many as half
108. 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).

109. The Court therefore refused to draw the analogy between the criminal justice systemwhere it is better to acquit the guilty than convict the innocent-and the involuntary commitment
system. Id.

110. This problem is a major difficulty with the commitment schemes proposed by Drs. Stone
and Roth, which are discussed at notes 145-60 and accompanying text infra.
111. Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures:An EmpiricalStudy in the Courtroom, 11 L. &

Soc. 654-55, 662-63; Lipsett & Lelos, Decision Makers in Law and Psychiatlryand the Involuntary
Commitment Process, 17 COMM. MENTAL HEa.TH J. 114, 120 (1981) (only 58% of patients com-

mitted after court hearings met the combined commitment criteria); Stier & Stoebe, supra note 78,
at 1370-71; Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor MentalDisorder: The Application of California's
Lanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 11 L. & Soc. REv. 629, 647 (1977) (major finding was that the statu-

tory criteria for civil commitment were not strictly applied); Wickham, Hospitalizationof the Men-
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the persons committed in a jurisdiction do not meet the jurisdiction's

statutory criteria for commitment." 2 Thus, both theory and data indicate that there is little reason to believe that civil commitment can be
reasonably limited. As the studies show, statutory reform does not
seem to make much difference. At best, as suggested above, one can try
to develop precisely defined standards that would be satisfied by rare,
clear cases." 13 If such standards were accompanied by rigorous, adversary procedures, reasonable limitations on wrongful commitment
might result. Such standards and procedural behavior appear unlikely
to be instituted, however; and, as we have seen, statutory reform does
not appear to make much difference.
Is a system that improperly incarcerates a substantial percentage
of its inmates-perhaps as many as half or more-supportable in our
society? It is clear that if the standards and procedures of the criminal
justice system led to a fifty percent erroneous conviction rate, the system would be blatantly unconstitutional.' " Until recently, the justifiability of the involuntary commitment system has been accepted without
much question and the burden of demonstrating its inequities has been
firmly on the opponents of involuntary hospitalization. The burden of
persuasion in the commitment debate should now shift to the proponents of the system to demonstrate that commitment can be appropriately limited. If they cannot, our duty to protect the liberty of all
persons must lead us to forego commitment in those few cases where
many persons might agree that it is warranted. Unless the system can
be demonstrably reformed, too little benefit win be provided at the expense of far too much deprivation of liberty.
C. The States Will Not ProvideAdequate Care and Treatment to
Involuntarilo Committed Persons

The relatively lax standards and procedures for the deprivation of
liberty in the involuntary commitment system are often thought to be
justified on the ground that the system aims to do good for the sick
tally 1 in Idaho and the Needfor Reform, IDAHo L. REV. 211, 230-31 (1980). See generally
Chambers, Community Based Treatment andthe Constitution;the Principle of the Least Restrictive
Alternative, in ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HosPrrAL TREATMENT 23, 25-26 (L. Stein & M. Test

eds. 1978).
112. Lelos, supra note 77, at 180; Stier & Stoebe, supra note 78, at 1371-90; Wickhlam, supra
note 111, at 230-3 1; Psychiatric News, Nov. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 3. See also Hiday & Markell,
Components of Dangerousness Legal Standardsin Civil Commitment, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIAT.
405, 410, 412 (1980) (only 55.3% of cases met Lessard standard for dangerousness; if restrictive

criteria for dangerousness were used, only 7.5% of cases were commitable).
113. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.

114. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 198, 208 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36465 (1970).
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recipients of its ministrations.'" 5 Indeed, the involuntary commitment
system is allegedly distinguishable from the criminal justice system because commitment has and achieves benign, therapeutic aims." l6 It
seems inhumane to prevent needy persons from receiving services because of excessively stringent substantive and procedural requirements
for involuntary hospitalization.
A crucial buttress for this argument is the contention that proper
care and treatment will be provided to persons who are committed.
Accordingly, it must be asked whether the promise of adequate care
and treatment is currently being fulfilled and whether the promise is
likely to be fulfilled in the future. These questions are especially pertinent if one considers the generally negative attitudes the public holds
toward the mentally disordered and the almost universally insufficient
public resources allocated to their care.
Even under ideal conditions, current mental health treatments are
unlikely to "cure" more than a handful of those committed of their
deviant behavior. There is general agreement, first, that most mental
health treatments, especially those useful for severely disordered persons, ameliorate symptoms rather than curing allegedly underlying illnesses, 1 7 and second, that all treatments are frequently unsuccessful
and are sometimes even harmful."' Furthermore, reducing symptoms
rarely causes major improvement in the broad range of social disabilities that led to the person's involuntary commitment."t 9 For this reason
and because mental disorder is often not causally linked to legally relevant behavior, successful treatment of mental disorder does not guarantee the diminution of the legally relevant behaviors such as
or incompetence that are also required for
dangerousness
20
commitment.
Moreover, there are simply not sufficient funds to provide any sub115. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979); French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351,
1359-60 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 39, at 77.
116. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
117. Committee on Research, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Pharmacotherapy
and Psychotherapy: Paradoxes, Problems and Progress 279-81, 427 (1979); Scheff, MedicalDamlnance: Psychoactive Drugs and Mental Health Policy, 19 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 299, 301-03
(1976).
118. Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 936, 938
(1974); see H. STRUPP, S. HADLEY & B. GOMES-SCHWARTZ, PSYCHOTHERAPY FOR BETTER OR
WORSE 11, 119 (1977); Jeste & Wyatt, ChangingEpidemiologyofTardive Dyskinesia: An Overview,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 297 (1981); Klawans, Getz & Perlick, Tardive Dyskinesia: Review and Update, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 900 (1980).
119. May, supra note 50, at 689-90. See A. STONE, supra note 43, at 213-15.
120. See Morse, supra note 23, at 637-38; Nuehring, Thayer & Ladner, On The FactorsPredicting Rehospitalization Among Two State Mental Hospital Patient Populations, 7 ADMIN.
MENTAL HEALTH 247, 266-68 (1980); Rabkin, supra note 34, at 25-26; Rosenblatt & Mayer, The
Recidivism of MentalPatients:A Review ofPastStudies, 44 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 697 (1974).
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stantial fraction of patients with the type of services that would yield

the optimum chance of improving their symptoms, not to mention their
general psychosocial disabilities. For the most part, our public (and
many private) hospitals treat their patients almost entirely by removing
disordered persons from their supposedly stressful environments, by

prescribing psychotropic medication with more or less indifferent
care, 12 1 and by providing a purportedly therapeutic milieu. Even pro-

viding maximally beneficial chemotherapy requires expert staffing that
is beyond the resources of most public hospitals. More general therapeutic services to remedy psychosocial disabilities are highly labor in-

tensive12 2 and would require funding that is literally unimaginable at
present. But without social rehabilitation, it is highly likely that patients will simply revolve back into the system, again to be rendered
less symptomatic by chemotherapy, but still lacking the skills to make a
successful adjustment in the community.
Many hospitals are not even able to provide minimally adequate
custodial care. Even in "advanced" states that supposedly maintain the
best hospitals and provide the best services, revelations of inadequate
and sometimes inhumane care and treatment have surfaced to shock

the public.12 3 It is well to remember that the gruesome conditions in
Alabama hospitals exposed in the Wyatt cases"2 4 were occurring in the

even today inhumane and antither1970's, not the 1870's, and 2that
5
apeutic conditions continue.
The inadequate conditions of public mental hospitals have been a

feature of state mental health care for over a century. 126 Many of the
121. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Right to Treatment Suit as an A'gent of Change, 136 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 1428, 1429-30 (1979); Mason, Nerviano & De Berger, Patternsof4ntiosychotic Drug
Use in FourSoutheastern State Hospitals,38 DISEASES NERV. Sys. 541 (1977). See generally Gillis
& Moran, An Analysis of Drug Decision in a State PsychiatricHospital,37 J. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 32
(1981); Gills, Lipkin & Moran, Drug Therapy Decisions: A Social Judgment Analysis, 169 J.
NERV. & MENTAL DISEASE 439 (1981).
122. See, e.g., G. PAUL & R. LENTZ, PSYCHOSOCIAL TREATMENT OF CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENTS (1977).

123. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § 4, at 5, col. 3; Gilliam, 36 More Mental Hospital
Deaths Questionable, L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1976, § I, at 1, col. I.
124. Wyatt v. Ireland, 3 MENTAL DISAB. L. RPTR. 403 (M.D. Ala. 1979); Wyatt v. Stickney,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforcedby 344 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), a'd in part,rev'dand remandedin part on othergroundssub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
125. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Wis. 1981); Wyatt v. Ireland, 3 MENTAL
DISAB. L. RPTR. 403 (M.D. Ala. 1979).
126. J. TALBOT, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLUM: A CRITICAL STUDY OF STATE HOSPITAL
MANAGEMENT, SERVICES, AND CARE 2-4, 18-22, 47-83. Even when conditions are not brutally
inhumane, life in state mental hospitals is often depersonalizing, dehumanizing, and unpleasant,
and it may often be antitherapeutic. W. COCKERHAM, SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDER 274-86
(1981) (citing research literature and first person accounts); R. STUART, TRICK OR TREATMENT 2134 (1970); J. WING, REASONING ABOUT MADNESS 26-27, 131-32 (1978); but see Johnstone, Owens,
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psychiatrists are poorly qualified, if "qualified" at all; 12 7 physical conditions and staffing are inadequate; 128 and satisfactory treatment is a
myth. 129 Periodic exposes and calls for reform have not yet led to acceptable improvement. Although courts have shown a willingness to
supervise public mental hospitals when the level of care provided drops
beneath a minimally humane level of decency, 30 there is still no evidence that legislatures are willing to allocate the money necessary to
ensure optimum care and treatment.' 3 ' Indeed, states faced with right
to treatment decrees that force them to expend far greater resources on
their patients have responded by "dumping" the patients into the community' 32 instead of treating them with the degree of care and expertise
dictated by decency and medical ethics. This is not to say that there
have not been improvements in state hospital care; it is simply to underscore the reality of inadequate care and treatment nearly everywhere. Arguments that what is available is better than nothing are
unacceptable. People who are locked up because they are allegedly
disordered must be treated properly. If they are not, we should admit
Gold, Crow & MacMillan, Institutionalization and the Defects of Schizophrenia, 139 BRIT. J.
PSYCHiAT. 195 (1981). The classic work on life in mental hospitals and other "total institutions"
remains E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 1-320 (1961).
127. A. Stone, PsychiatricAbuse and Legal Reform: Two Ways to Make a Bad Situation
Worse, INT. J. L. & PSYCHIAT.-(in press) (at 29 in Browning Hoffman Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of Virginia School of Law, June 12, 1981). Many state hospital psychiatrists
are foreign-trained and are clearly less qualified than American graduates. In addition, they have
problems speaking and understanding English, skills that are crucial to psychiatric practice. Torrey & Taylor, CheapLaborfrom Foreign Nations, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 428, 429 (1973); Talbott,
The Problems and PotentialRoles of the State Mental Hospital, in STATE MENTAL HOSPITALS:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS 21, 23 (J. Talbott ed. 1980). On the problem of staffing state hospitals, see generally Torrey & Taylor, supra.
128. Knesper & Hirtel, Strategiesto Attract Psychiatriststo State MentalHospital Work: Resuitsfrom a Survey of PotentialEmployees, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHiAT. 1135 (1981). The critical
understaffing problem was most recently exposed in Bower, Understaffing Severe in State Hospitals
Nationwide, Psychiatric News, Sept. 18, 1981, at I. It appears that the primary "therapists," the
direct care providers in state hospitals, are nonprofessional aides. Birnbach, Back Ward Society,
1981. Implicationsfor Residential Treatment and Staff Training, 32 Hose. & Comm. PSYCHIAT.
550, 551 (1981) (reporting on the experience in New York State). The reasons for the shortage of
well qualified psychiatrists in state mental hospitals seem clear: low status, poor conditions, insufficient budgets, lack of adequate treatment programs, and all the other problems besetting state
hospitals. See J. TALBOTT, supra note 126, at 82-83; Talbott, supra note 127, at 22-26.
129. See New York State Ass'n. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
768 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
130. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1326-29 (E.D. Pa.
1977), 451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978), mod/fed, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded,
100 S. Ct. 1351 (1981); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced by 334 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aI'd in
part,rev'd and remandedin part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
131. Chambers, supra note 111, at26, 36. Butcf. Kaufman, supra note 121, at 1430-31 (citing
examples of increased appropriations for mental health as a result of right to treatment suits).
132. Brown & Bremer, InadequateMeans to a Noble End- The Right to TreatmentParadox,6
J. PSYCHIAT. & LAW 45, 58-59 (1978); N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979 § 1, at I, col. 5.

1982]

IN VOL UNTAR Y COMMITMENT

that the major goals of involuntary hospitalization are preventive detention and warehousing and proceed to analyze the system on that
basis.
Improvements in treatment techniques are unlikely to provide a
solution. Although mental health treatments are definitely improving,
no major breakthrough is in sight. 33 Even if the level of efficacy increases sharply in light of new discoveries, it is doubtful that the new
treatments will be cheap or easy to administer. Even adequate chemotherapy, a relatively cheap and easily administered modality, is currently beyond the capability of most public hospitals. If new
treatments are efficacious but costly, in the light of past history there is
little reason to believe that legislatures will vote the funds necessary to
provide these treatments at a level consonant with reasonable psychiatric and psychological skill.
There is one answer to the appalling state of affairs in our public
hospitals that has some surface appeal: if commitment were limited to
the few extreme cases of severe disorder where it seems warranted, then
treatment resources would not be spread as thin and those committed
involuntarily might be adequately cared for and treated. In order for
services to patients to improve, however, states should not reduce their
funding of hospitals in response to a decrease in the patient population-an extraordinarily unlikely event. In addition, the treatment provided would still be unlikely to alleviate general psychosocial
disabilities. The costs of treatment plans that could alleviate those disabilities would be so enormous that it is doubtful states would be willing to spend that much money, especially for so few patients.
Moreover, even if the best treatment resources now available were offered, many patients would not improve. Lastly, as argued above, it is
highly unlikely that commitment could be limited to those few polar
cases where commitment is warranted.' 34 Putting strict limits on commitment is thus unlikely to cure the shortcomings in hospital treatment
and care.
Until and unless, first, legislatures show a greater willingness to
allocate money to public mental patients; second, truly qualified mental
health professionals demonstrate a willingness to enter the public hospital system in great numbers; and, third, mental health treatments improve greatly, the benign and therapeutic aims of the involuntary
commitment system will remain unattained. Both society at large and
the mental health professions are to be blamed for this scandalous state
133. For example, there have been no major discoveries of new psychotropic medications for
about a decade. On the other hand, mental health professionals have clearly learned how to use
the available drugs more effectively.
134. See text accompanying notes 58-114 spra.
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of affairs. The inadequate funding of hospital and community mental
health services is an indication of both social distaste for the mentally
disordered and a lack of social commitment to humane treatment. Involuntary hospitalization as currently practiced will not alleviate
chronic disorders and social disabilities that will otherwise lead to a
lifelong series of commitments, nor will it restore its inmates to lives of
productive happiness. The short term reduction of symptoms, although
useful, is simply not adequate treatment. Therefore, to maintain that
involuntary commitment is ultimately beneficial to the vast majority of
135
incarcerated patients is to propagate a cruel myth.
D. HospitalizationIs Not Necessaryfor the Efficacious Treatment of
the Vast Majority of Involuntarily Committed Patients
Almost all mental health treatments now available can be provided as efficaciously and usually more cheaply in less restrictive community settings than in closed hospitals.136 Starting at the lowest end of
the "treatment" spectrum, custodial care can be provided easily in the
135. It is not claimed that involuntary hospitalization is never beneficial or that involuntarily
hospitalized patients uniformly hold negative views of their hospital experience-such a claim is
contradicted by some reasonable evidence. E.g., L. BACHRACH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: AN
ANALYTICAL REVIEW AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976) (citing sources); Gove & Fain, A
Comparison of Voluntary & Committed PsychiatricPatients, 34 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 669, 675
(1977) (committed and voluntary patients both improved after hospitalization, but committed patients improved slightly more; both groups favorably evaluated the hospitalization experience);
Toews, el-Guebaly & Leckie, Patients'Reactionsto Their Commitment, 26 CAN. J. PSYCHIAT. 251
(1981); Weinstein, PatientAttitudes Toward Mental Hospitalization:A Review of Quantitative Re.
search, 20 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 237, 251-52 (1979) (no control for commitment status of
patients, however). But see Essex, Estroff, Kane, McLanahan, Robins, Dresser & Diamond, On
Weinstein's "PatientAttitudes Toward MentalHospitalization:A Review ofQuantitativeResearch"
(Comment on Weinstein,J.HSB., Sept. 1979), 21 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 393 (1980). Weinstein's defense of his study is The Favorablenessof Patients'AttitudesTowardMental Hospitalization (Reply to Comment by Essex et al.), 21 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 397 (1980). Weinstein
also notes, however, that a large proportion of patients had negative or ambiguous attitudes and
that he believes that his findings do not "speak for or against institutionalization, either for or
against patients' rights." Id. at 400.
Despite the few favorable findings such as these, however, the statements in the text are an
accurate reflection of the general reality of mental hospital treatment.
136. L. BACHRACH, supra note 135, at 23 n.27 (citing sources); Becker & Schulberg, Phasing
Out State Hospitals-A PsychiatricDilemma, 294 NEw ENG. J. MED. 255, 260 (1976); Test &
Stein, Community Treatment ofthe ChronicPatient: Research Overview, 4 SCHIZOPHRENIC BULL.
350, 351 (1978); Weinman & Kleiner, The Impact of Community Living and Community Member
Intervention on the Psychotic Patient, in ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HOSPITAL TREATMENT (L.
Stein & M. Test eds. 1978); see sources cited at note 142 infra. But cf. Sheridan & Teplin, Recidi-

vism In Difficult Patients: DifferencesBetween Community MentalHealth Centerand State Hospital
Admissions, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 688, 689 (1981) (difficult psychiatric patients referred to community mental health centers, 56% of whom were hospitalized, had reduced lengths of stay and
subsequent hospitalizations compared to patients admitted to state hospitals; hospitalization was
initially necessary for a majority of community patients despite the greater range of services available at the community mental health centers). See generally L. BACHRACH, supra note 135.
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community in decent board-and-care-type facilities. There is little reason why the prescription of medication or the provision of convulsive,
psychological, and social therapies also cannot be accomplished on an
outpatient basis. Research evidence supports the view that hospitalization, especially long term hospitalization, is rarely necessary and is
often antitherapeutic.1 37 Many disordered persons would probably be
quite willing to accept good outpatient treatments, nursing visits, or
other reasonable interventions if they were offered and explained by
professionals who behaved respectfully towards the
caring and careful
3
disordered. 1
It has been suggested that hospitalization is necessary because
neither courts nor lawyers have the ability to discover and coordinate
the less restrictive community services that admittedly would be efficacious if they were utilized.' 39 Although there is a present lack of resource information and coordination, one cannot imagine a weaker
argument in favor of the necessity of depriving a person of liberty. The
difficulty in gathering information about community treatment resources and coordinating a treatment plan is substantially outweighed
by the individual's interest in avoiding unnecessary involuntary commitment. Judges, mental health advocates, and allied social service
staff plainly will have to educate themselves and learn to create sensible
community treatment alternatives.
Some courts have held that the use of the least restrictive alternative is constitutionally compelled in the treatment process, 40 and some
137. Stier & Stoebe, supra note 78, at 1292; Test & Stein, Alternatives to Mental Hospital
Treatment, in ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HOSPITAL TREATMENT 43, 43-44 (L. Stein & M. Test
eds. 1978); see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally II- Practical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1126-30 (1972); Rosenblatt & Meyers,
supra note 120, at 700. See generally E. GOFFMAN, supra note 126, at 3-124.
Persons who are too disabled to look after themselves minimally and to offer an opinion on
hospitalization may be treated as nonprotesting and hospitalized for their own safety and care.
Additionally, some hospital capacity should exist for those who voluntarily want inpatient services
and who understand the costs and benefits of such services compared to the alternatives.
138. This might be especially true if the prospective patient or service recipient were sure that
seeking help for mental disorder or its consequent disabilities would not lead to incarceration.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there will be a population of chronically disordered persons
who will refuse or be unable to utilize community care. Schwartz & Goldfinger, The New Chronic
Patient: Clinical Characteristics of an Emerging Subgroup, 32 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 470
(1981). This Article admits that there will be costs to abolishing involuntary hospitalization, but
argues that, on balance, the benefits will exceed those costs. In any event, as will be discussed
below, there are probably not enough staff and resources to treat all the severely disabled patients
who want and can utilize resources. See note 179 and accompanying text infra.
139. Zusman, The Needfor Intervention: The Reasonsfor State Controlothe Mentally Disordered, in C. Warren, supra note 106, at 5 & 33.
140. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent
procedural history set forth in note 4 supra); Chambers, supra note 111, at 28, 29.
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legislatures, including Congress, have utilized the same doctrine as a
matter of social policy.' 4 1 The doctrine is based upon the sound assumption that if the primary purpose of commitment is truly to treat
people and not simply to remove them from the community, hospitalization is almost never justified. In those cases where it may appear
justified, creative use of community resources is likely to be as efficacious and cheaper than involuntary hospitalization, 142 and far less restrictive of the disordered person's liberty. In other words, if the
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. 1979); see, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-604
(1979).
142. Dickey, Gudeman, Hellman, Donatelle & Grinspoon, A Follow-up of Deinstitutionalized
Chronic PatientsFour Years After Discharge, 32 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 326 (1981) (all but 2
of 27 subjects preferred their current living situation to life in the state hospital); Stein & Test,
Alternativesto MentalHospitalTreatment: I ConceptualModel,Treatment Program,and Clinical
Evaluation, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 392 (1980) (empirical study and citing other studies);
sources cited at note 137 supra;see Washburn, Varmicelli, Longabaugh & Scheff, A Controlled
Comparison of PsychiatricDay Treatment and Inpatient Hospitalization,44 J. CONSULT & CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 665 (1976). Test and Stein also found that a total in-community program resulted in no
more burden on the family or community than the traditional approach. Test & Stein, Alternative
to Mental Hospital Treatment: III Social Cost, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHiAT. 409 (1980) (results
explained in part by large amount of support services provided to patients, families and community members). A number of studies have demonstrated that community services are cheaper than
hospitalization. Murphy & Datel, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Community Versus InstitutionalLiving, 27 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHiAT. 105 (1976); Sharfstein & Nafziger, Community Care. Costsand
Beneftsfor a ChronicPatient, 27 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 170 (1976); Weisbrod, Test & Stein,
Alternative to Mental Hospital Treatment: I1 Economic Benet-Cost Analysis, 37 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHiAT. 400 (1980) (extensive community treatment more expensive than hospitalization, but,
overall, community treatment cheaper). See also Sheehan & Atkinson, Comparative Costsof State
Hospitaland Community-BasedInpatient Care in Texas: Who Benefts Most?, 25 Hosp. & COMM.
PSYCHIAT. 242 (1974). But see Borus, Deinstitutionalizationof the Chronicall Mentall 111, 305
NEw ENG. J. MED. 339, 340-41 (1981). See generally Frank, Cost-Beneft Analsis in Mental
Health Services: A Review of the Literature, 8 ADMIN. MENTAL HEALTH 161 (1981). The most
recent study whose preliminary findings support the benefits and cost-effectiveness of community
treatment is Boyd, McGill & Falloon, Family Participationin the Community Rehabilitation of
Schizophrenics, 32 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 629 (1981). The methodology of many of the outcome studies of deinstitutionalization has been criticized, however, suggesting the need for some
caution in reaching conclusions. Braun, Kochansky, Shapiro, Greenberg, Gudeman, Johnson &
Shore, Overview: DeinstitutionalizationofPsychiatricPatients,A CriticalReview of Outcome Studies, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 736 (1981); but see Pasaminick, Letter to the Editor,Deinstitutionalization Studies: Some Clarocations, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1633 (1981).
One reason that many patients can now live relatively successfully outside state hospitals is
the provision by the federal government of Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Lamb &
Goertzel, The LongTerm Patient in the Era of Community Treatment, 34 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT.
679, 682 (1977). Unfortunately, SSI can also foster dependency and act as a disincentive to the
provision of effective social and vocational rehabilitation programs. Emerson, Rochford & Shaw,
Economics andEnterprisein Boardand CareHomesfor the Mentall 111, 24 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
771, 783 (1981) (referring to the current board and care system); Lamb & Rogawski, Supplemental
Security Income and the Sick Role, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1221 (1978). This is a difficult and not
entirely soluble problem, but its solution would seem to be the provision of intensive rehabilitation services and counseling to wean the disordered person away from a life of nonproductive
dependence. Of course, to the extent that society fails to provide adequate services in the community, there will be no solution to this problem. Nevertheless, a life of nonproductive dependency
in freedom is preferable to such a life in a locked hospital.
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necessary alternatives were seriously pursued, most persons now committable would not need to be committed even if they met the statutory
criteria.
Of course, society can fail, as it does now, to provide services to
people at liberty in the community as much as it fails to provide them
to incarcerated patients. The condition of many "deinstitutionalized"
ex-patients in the community is a national disgrace. 143 Moreover,
knowledge of mental health science is as rudimentary in the community as it is in the hospital. But if society is willing to expend the resources and to make the humane commitment to caring for and
treating people who may need and want such services, these services
can be provided as efficaciously and more cheaply in the freedom of
the community. 144 The involuntary commitment system hardly seems
justified by the tiny fraction of cases that perhaps can be treated best in
a hospital, especially in light of the justifiable pessimism about hospital
conditions and treatment and the inevitably high risk of
overcommitment.
II
NEW PROPOSALS FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

In recent years, two eminent psychiatrists concerned with mental
health law, Drs. Alan A. Stone and Loren H. Roth, have proposed similar new commitment schemes that attempt to strike a fair balance be143. The characterization, "national disgrace," is mine. For a description and analysis of the
situation that led to that characterization, see Arnhoff, Social Consequences of Policy Toward
Mental Illness, 188 SCIENCE 1277 (1975); Kirk & Therrien, Community MentalHealth Myths and
the Fateof FormerHospitalizedPatients, 38 PSYCHIAT. 209 (1975); Scull, 4 New Tradein Lunacy:
The Recommodocation ofthe MentalPatient,8 AM. BeHAv. SCIENTIST 741,743-44 (1981); sources
cited at note 132 supra.
Some commentators suggest that instead of deinstitutionalization, what has in fact occurred is

"transinstitutionalization," the relocation of former state hospital patients into different facilities
such as nursing homes or board and care homes. Scull, supra, at 744-50; Warren, New Formsof
Social Control: The Myth ofDeinstitutionalization,8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 724, 726-30 (1981).
This phenomenon is simply another indication of the all too often scandalous societal response to
the dignity and needs of the mentally disordered.
144. It is not suggested that the proper provision of voluntary and community services is easy
or that providing them will produce normal behavior in chronically, severely disordered persons.
Such services are not a panacea. But to the extent effective treatments are available, they can be
provided without involuntary hospitalization.
If society made the commitment to providing reasonable care to its disordered persons in the
community, mental health care might become more expensive than it is at present. The greater
expense would probably not be created, however, by the high costs per patient of community
treatment compared to hospitalization. Rather, the increase would be the result of providing adequate treatment to vastly greater numbers of persons. I assume that if fine services were freely
available in the community, there would be great demand for such services. Nevertheless, the cost
per patient of community services is probably cheaper than the cost of hospitalization. See note
142 supra. A resultant increase in the use of services because they are reasonable and available is
hardly a reason to cut off such services to needy people.
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tween liberty and paternalism. 45 Both authors recognize the enormous
deprivation of liberty involved in involuntary hospitalization and
therefore propose laws that they believe would limit commitment to
those cases where a true medical need is apparent or where society's
interest in commitment is overwhelming. Drs. Stone and Roth wish
psychiatrists to be returned to their proper role as caring, treating professionals, and each of their analyses is marked by wisdom, honesty,
compassion, and restraint. Their proposals, however, ultimately suffer
from some of the same shortcomings as existing systems, and thus
should not be adopted. To support this conclusion, Part II will first
describe their proposals (by focusing on the specific language of the
Roth proposal, which includes the Stone proposal in slightly modified
form) and will then consider them in light of the analysis presented in
Part I.
The preferred basis for commitment in the Stone-Roth proposal is
parens patriae based on incompetence. 46 Drs. Roth and Stone want to
hospitalize and treat involuntarily only those persons who are terribly
disordered, suffering, and incompetent. More particularly, their proposal only recommends commitment when 1) the person suffers from a
severe and reliably diagnosed mental disorder; 2) the immediate prognosis for the person is major distress unless treatment is provided; 3)
the mental disorder "substantially impairs the person's ability to understand or communicate about the possibility of treatment"; and 4) the
risk/benefit ratio of treatment is such that a reasonable person would
consent to a brief, e.g., six week, trial of treatment that is renewable
once for another six weeks.' 47 Thus, the Stone-Roth proposal adopts
the traditional model of doctor-patient relationships wherein the purpose of the relationship is the alleviation of suffering by voluntarily
accepted treatment, except where the patient is desperately needy and
incapable of rationally deciding whether to accept treatment.
Neither Dr. Roth nor Dr. Stone tries to justify extensively the limi145. A. STONE, supra note 43, at 65-69; Roth, A Commitment Lawfor Patients, Doctors, and
Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHiAT. 1121 (1979).
146. Adoption ofa parens patriae model is clearly opposed to the present dominant national
trend towards adopting a dangerousness model. Judicial attitudes show a preference for the latter

model because it allows preventive detention of "dangerous" persons who can be briefly institutionalized and "treated," rather than burdening the already overcrowded criminal courts. Bloom,
Shore & Treleaver, Oregon's Civil Commitment Statute: Stone's "Thank You Theory'--A Judicial
Survey, 7 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHiAT. & L. 381, 387 (1979).
Dr. Roth's proposal includes a preventive detention form of commitment for those who are

dangerous, but persons committed under this model cannot be treated involuntarily unless they
are also incompetent. Dr. Stone explicitly eschews commitments solely for dangerousness, al-

though it appears that some people who are dangerous to self may meet his "suffering" criterion.
Dr. Roth's dangerousness proposal will not be discussed because it does not differ extensively
from relatively libertarian-oriented dangerousness models now being adopted or suggested.
147. Roth, supra note 145, at 1122.
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tation of the commitment proposal to only the mentally disordered.
They appear to assume that the mentally disordered are specially incompetent or that the incompetence of the mentally disordered is somehow significantly different from the incompetence of apparently normal
persons. This assumption is of course widely accepted, but its systematic defense is rarely attempted: the conclusion is simply made time
and again. As this Article has demonstrated, however, this conclusion
is not warranted. Until a persuasive, nonconclusory case is made out
for special treatment of the mentally disordered, a more intelligent conclusion is that involuntary commitment of only this class of citizens is
not supportable theoretically.
Assuming for the sake of argument that paternalistic commitment
and special treatment of the mentally disordered are both justified, the
question remains: Will the Stone-Roth proposal work? To answer this
question, the proposal's commitment criteria must be examined.
The first criterion, that the person suffers from a reliably diagnosed major disorder, is problematic. As suggested earlier, reliance on
the categories of mental disorder creates too much opportunity for discretion by not identifying proper candidates for involuntary commitment with sufficient precision. Moreover, a person with a reliably
diagnosed severe disorder is not necessarily crazy enough to need commitment.' 48 If the remaining criteria are more crucial, a certain degree
of leeway on the threshold criterion may not pose a serious problem.
Nonetheless, the threshold criterion of mental disorder undercuts the
theoretical validity of the whole enterprise by failing to distinguish adequately the special class to whom involuntary commitment should
apply.
The central criterion for commitment is an immediate prognosis of
"major distress" if treatment is not provided. 14 9 Even if a person is
severely disordered and incompetent, commitment will not be possible
without this prognosis. But what is the definition of (avoidable) major
distress? Is intense psychological pain necessary or sufficient? Would
severe symptomatology leading to major disruption in family life, career, or reputation suffice if unaccompanied by intense psychological
pain? How is major distress, however defined, to be measured? How
accurately can mental health professionals predict immediate major
distress absent treatment? What data are pertinent to this crucial
prediction?
As should be apparent from these questions, it will be almost impossible to apply the criterion of major distress in a way that avoids
148. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
149. Dr. Stone also uses the term "suffering." A. STONE, supra note 43, at 70.
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improper commitment. The definition of distress will differ widely
among both mental health professionals and legal decisionmakers;
value judgments about the degree of distress that warrants commitment
are bound to intrude. Moreover, it is doubtful that there is sufficient
hard data to vitiate the prediction problem,150 and clinical wisdom or
hunch should not suffice as evidence to support involuntary commitment in our society. In sum, the major distress criterion inevitably will
application and, with it, unacceptable
produce discretionary
5
overcommitment.1

1

The Stone-Roth incompetency criterion requires that the person's
diagnosed illness substantially impair his or her ability to understand
or to communicate about the possibility of treatment. Before discussing the standards for this criterion, an observation about the requisite
causal connection between the illness and behavioral disability is in
order: we do not know, in general, when a psychiatric illness "causes"
other behaviors. What we do know is that crazy behaviors-inexplicably irrational thoughts and feelings- are sometimes clearly implicated
in other behaviors.' 52 Take, for example, the person who refuses medication because of a belief that the doctor is a hostile agent trying to
poison him. Obviously the person is unable reasonably to weigh information about the medication because of the crazy belief. One could
say that it is the patient's paranoia that causes the lack of understanding, but in fact, the crazy belief is the cause. Paranoia, after all, is diagnosed on the basis of behavioral criteria-it is a shorthand for a
confluence of behaviors 153 rather than the name of an entity with a
defined morbid anatomy or pathophysiology. The question of incompetence is better posed without reference to the cause of the putative
incompetence; when reference to the cause is required, the question
person's capability for rationality conshould be asked in terms of the
5
cerning the treatment issue.

1

In applying the "understanding" standard in the incompetence cri150. To be of any use, the data must be relevant to the legal definition of major distress and
sufficiently precise to allow the legal decisionmaker to assess the probable accuracy of the
prediction.
151. The issue of the "avoidability" of major distress is related to the "availability of treatment" criterion and to the "reasonable person" criterion for imposing treatment on incompetent
patients. These issues will therefore be discussed together. See note 159 and accompanying text
infra.152. Morse, supra note 23, at 577-82.
153. DSM-III, supra note 14, at 195-98.
154. Dr. Stone would place the burden of offering a reason for treatment refusal on the disordered and suffering person. In order for the patient to be declared incompetent, the mental health
professional must "demonstrate that the refusal is irrational and is based on or related to the
diagnosed illness. . .

."

A. STONE, supra note 43, at 68. Reasons that are not a product of the

illness--those not based on misperceptions of reality-must be respected even if they appear irrational to the mental health professional. Id. In brief, the test is, "Does the patient's objection to
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teflon, the Stone-Roth proposal suggests using the following alternative
tests:
(1) Does the patient understand the generally agreed upon conse-

quences (the potential benefits and the potential risks) both of being
treated and of not being treated?
(2) Does the patient understand why a particular form of treatment is
being considered or recommended in his case? 155
These are surely among the relevant questions to ask to determine if a
person is competent to decide whether to accept treatment, but neither
test is self-evidently the right one. Instead of asking whether the person
in fact understands, it might be more proper to inquire if the person is
capable of understanding. 56 Furthermore, the very definition of "understand" is problematic. Does it mean simply the ability to rearticulate the information provided in a fashion that demonstrates that the
person has comprehended the information in a reasonably intelligent
way? Or, does it require that the person have affective or emotional
understanding (whatever that might be) as well? How much understanding, however defined, is sufficient to support a finding of legal
competence and how is it measured? It is of course true that many
legal standards are frustratingly vague and difficult to apply, but in this
case a deprivation of liberty for up to twelve weeks is at stake. It appears all too likely that the vagueness of the "understanding" test will
ensure that its definition will vary enormously and that value judgments will affect the commitment decision. 157 However sound the
question asked is in theory, in practice decisions about "understandand will produce unacceptable amounts of
ing" will often be 5arbitrary
8
overcommitment. 1
treatment seem irrational and based on his illness?" Id. at 69. Thus, the provability of a causal
connection is implicitly accepted by Dr. Stone.
155. Roth, supra note 145, at 1122. Note that both Drs. Roth and Stone term the allegedly
incompetent person a patient. See also note 154 supra. A person, however, does not become a
patient until incompetence is proven. This imprecise use of terminology is not a major problem,
but the choice of words covertly begs important questions.
156. People with the ability to behave rationally often behave irrationally, even when they are
admonished not to. In practice, the determination of whether a person is capable of certain behavior will be based on whether he or she actually behaves that way. Nevertheless, the distinction
should be preserved and decisionmakers should be required to examine the capability for understanding in a broader set of contexts. See notes 38-48 and accompanying text supra. If a "capability for rationality" test is not adopted, I should prefer that the decisionmaker ask simply whether
the person's reason for treatment refusal is crazy. This may seem preposterously simplistic, but it
is the real question in issue, and it avoids the question begging involved in asking whether lack of
understanding is a product of the person's alleged disorder.
157. See generally Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHiAT. 279 (1977).
158. The third disjunctive test for competence in the Stone-Roth proposal--"Does the patient
express a choice for or against treatment?"-seems much less problematic. Roth, supra note 145,
at 1122. Indeed, as discussed at text following note 161 infra, a patient in dire physical danger
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The fourth, and final, Stone-Roth criterion can be broken down
into two related treatment requirements: (1) treatment that would prevent immediate major distress must be available, and (2) the available
treatment must be such that a reasonable person would accept it in
light of the risk/benefit ratio under the circumstances. The second requirement is by far the more troublesome. The reasonable person test
is once more an invitation to overly discretionary decisionmaking.
Such tests are used throughout the law, but, again, the degree of deprivation of liberty makes the potential cost to the individual much higher
here than in most-other situations.
A more particular danger is that reasonableness will be judged by
comparing the treatment available in public institutions against no
treatment at all. If the risk/benefit ratio utilized does not consider state
of the art treatment or even the average treatment provided by good
private practitioners or hospitals, the minimal treatment available at
most public institutions will be considered acceptably good, thus facilitating a finding that a reasonable person would accept such treatment.
This standard, however, is far too low. Reasonable persons who understood the degree to which they would be "shortchanged"-albeit perhaps helped somewhat-in a minimal institution might well refuse
involuntary hospitalization and treatment. 59 The question should not
be whether involuntary hospitalization would be efficacious, but
whether it would be sufficiently more effective than treatment in less
restrictive settings to justify the deprivation of liberty involved. The
decisionmaker should be aware that what is being offered will typically
be considerably less than what is available in private institutions and
no more than what is available in a community setting.
In summary, although the Stone-Roth proposal asks most of the
right questions under a parens patriae approach, it is theoretically unjustified and practically unworkable. No systematic argument is
who expresses no preference about treatment could be regarded as nonprotesting and treated
accordingly.
159. Dr. Roth properly notes the possibility of a competent person making a "living will" or
otherwise declaring that if he or she becomes incompetent, involuntary treatment is not desired.
Id. at 1123. Such preferences would be respected. One might also ask, however, why a legal
decisionmaker should not employ a subjective test even in the absence of a living will or similar
declaration. (Dr. Roth mentions this possibility, but does not examine it in detail. Id.) In some
cases, it will be relatively clear that an incompetent person who previously made no statements
about the issue would have expressed a preference not to be treated. A person who, while competent, had consistently refused all forms of medical treatment is one such case. Of course, in cases
where there is no reasonable direct or indirect evidence of what the person's subjective preference
would be when he or she becomes incompetent, the objective test would have to suffice. For an
interesting attempt to specify relatively precisely the risk/benefit ratio of hospitalization (in the
context of determining the proper length of commitment), see Comment, Substantive Due Process
Limits on the Duration of Civil Commitment/or the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 205, 226-39, 259-64 (1981).
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presented for special treatment of the mentally disordered and substantial overcommitment is inevitable. That Drs. Stone and Roth made no
pretense of working out every detail is a source of little comfort because
the problems outlined here cannot be remedied by definitional or procedural tinkering. In his proposal, Dr. Roth alludes to the general
problem of the "dishonest" application of commitment criteria.16 0 Although the Stone-Roth proposal, like most commitment proposals,
aims to do good, it too would be "dishonestly" applied and many citizens would needlessly be deprived of their liberty. Moreover, the proposals do not and cannot reform the conditions in state hospitals and
raise their level of care. The Stone-Roth proposal may be better than
most, but the mentally disordered, mental health professionals, and society would be better off if the system of involuntary hospitalization
simply and completely ceased to exist.
III
THE BENEFITS OF ABOLITION

The benefits of abolition or severe limitation of involuntary commitment will be an increase in liberty, a reduction in the role confusion
and onerous tasks of mental health professionals, the enhancement of
treatment, and the freeing of wasted resources.
A.

The Extension of Liberty

The primary benefit of abolition will be an increase in liberty in
our society. People who are not demonstrably dangerous will not be
preventively detainable, nor will the state be able to substitute its judgments for those of its citizens. Preventive detention is simply insupportable, because it is a vast deprivation of liberty that is not
outweighed by needs for public protection. The model of the criminal
law is worthy of emulating; persons should not be incarcerated, no matter how dangerous they are, until they commit a proscribed act.' 6 ' Furthermore, as long as a person is capable of expressing a preference
about hospitalization and treatment, the state should not be able to
substitute its judgment for that preference. Nonprotesting persons
could be hospitalized and treated until they indicated they no longer
desired such services. But a commitment to human dignity and liberty
requires that all persons be allowed to decide for themselves issues as
160. Roth, supra note 145, at 1122. This refers to loose application of commitment criteria in
order to achieve hospitalization. It does not mean that those who do so are malevolent; indeed,
their motives are often therapeutic. Nevertheless, the result of dishonest application is the unlawful commitment of many citizens.
161.

But f. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, at 423-27 (the law of criminal attempts

will often allow the state to intervene before harm occurs).
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important as psychiatric hospitalization and treatment, even if the reasons that they give seem crazy and not hospitalizing and treating them
seems inhumane.162 This incompatibility between liberty and humaneness is unfortunately fundamental; stringently limiting involuntary
commitment can do no more than make the two goals incrementally
less incompatible.
Several counterarguments may be made to the position that liberty
will be increased by abolition. One response stems from the observation that some objecting patients are in fact ambivalent about their hospitalization.'63 On the basis of this observation, one might argue that
some of the protesters are not being wrongly committed because they
"really" want to go into a hospital. Stated another way, the commitment system is simply helping large numbers of persons to obtain hospitalization without having to admit to themselves that they want it.
Although ambivalence surely exists, this argument is entirely
unpersuasive.
How can the relative strengths of the conflicting desires be measured and compared? How do we know what a person "really" wants
to do? There is no way at present to answer these questions. A sensible
legal system must develop reasonable decision rules that use workable
and reasonably objective criteria. The most workable and reasonable
is to accept the overtly articulated desire of the person, even if other
behavior gives some indication of ambivalence. Assessing unconscious
motives is problematic at best;" basing decisions on such motives is
simply an invitation to subjective and widely discretionary decisionmaking. In the criminal law, a person who intentionally shoots at another and misses will be guilty of attempted murder even though
alienists of the unconscious may try to show that, because of unconscious conflict, the person did not "really" intend to kill. However, the
assailant's intentional act must be determinative unless we are to make
a mockery of notions of criminal responsibility and the relevance of
65
mental state explanations to moral, practical, and legal judgments.
And so it should be in the commitment system. If a person "really"
wishes to enter the hospital, let that person sign in voluntarily. We can
try to reduce ambivalence by offering efficacious community treatments. But if any person consciously protests, that decision must be
respected although there is evidence of ambivalence. Liberty, dignity,
and principled decisionmaking require this. 166
162. Morse, supra note 23, at 627-39.
163. C. Warren, supra note 106, at 89-94.
164. Morse, FailedExplanations and CriminalResponsibility: Experts and The Unconscious
(forthcoming in 68 VA. L. REv. - (1982)).
165. Moore, Responsibilityand the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL L. REv. 1563, 1639-75 (1980).

166. There will be some model cases where the person objects to hospitalization but his or her
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Another possible counterargument is based upon cases of disordered persons that seem to cry out for intervention: the delusional person who seems on the verge of a violent outburst or who appears to be
destroying the fabric of his or her family; the terribly disorganized person whose life is apparently in jeopardy because he or she seems unable
to cope with minimal food, shelter, clothing, or medical needs; the person in the throes of a manic episode who appears to be jeopardizing a
career or reputation; or, perhaps most compellingly, the person on the
verge of suicide who appears clearly to be making a mistake in judgment about his or her helplessness and the hopelessness of his or her
life situation. Proponents of commitment point to such cases and claim
that, in the name of decency and humanity, society must intervene. 167
It may be claimed that in such situations the disordered person lacks
"effective" liberty, that the only freedom one then has is the freedom to
destroy one's life or to live in misery.
But the argument that freedom is illusory for some crazy persons
because they lead lives of degradation and misery cannot be proven or
quickly proves too much. A great number of persons who are not crazy
lead lives of degradation and misery and could probably be helped by
social rehabilitation measures, but we respect their right to liberty
rather than deprive them of their freedom by forcing them into rehabilitation programs in locked institutions. Distinguishing between the
two, based on the presumption that the mentally disordered are "possessed" by their illnesses and thus cannot choose how to lead their lives,
is unsatisfactory. 4s previously discussed, the belief that the mentally
disordered are not autonomous is little more than an intuitive hunch,
especially in light of evidence that shows even the craziest person has
substantial control over his behavior. 168 More importantly, that person
has an inalienable right to liberty that is indistinguishable from that of
more "normal" citizens. 169 Of course, useful voluntary services should
be offered to crazy, disabled persons, and we should attempt to persuade needy citizens to make use of them. Moreover, as previously
noted, nonprotesting persons may be treated. 170 But if we do not override even the most horrendously irrational decisions of normal persons
behavior appears to be a clear cry for hospitalization. Such cases will be few, and even they will
be open to other interpretations. Moreover, it bears repeating that we should not construct a
system that will operate improperly most of the time simply to be able to deal with the few cases
for which that system is theoretically appropriate.
167. Chodoff, supra note 58; see, e.g., Dickey, supra note 60, at 32-33.
168. See text accompanying notes 15-29 supra;see also Wear, supra note 15, at 293, 303-05.
169. Morse, supra note 23, at 653.
170. See text following note 161 supra. By a nonprotesting person, I mean a person so disabled that he or she is unable to respond coherently or to respond at all to an offer of services. In
such cases, emergency services can of course be provided, but a guardianship should be sought to
look after the person's more long term needs. When that person recovers sufficiently to express a
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that endanger their lives or the welfare of their families,17 ' we have no
justification for authorizing a greater deprivation of liberty for those
who are termed mentally disordered. To claim that we care about the
"effective" liberty of crazy people but to be willing to ignore its lack in
the lives of "normals" simply exposes the hypocrisy of the involuntary
commitment system.
The solution to the appalling problems of the mentally disordered
is not a system of involuntary incarceration that is overutilized and insufficiently therapeutic. Hospitalization of the disordered simply
evades the reality of their problems.17 2 It is outrageous that our society
has followed deinstitutionalization with the malevolent neglect of
needy disordered persons. The fair comparison is not between hospitalization and neglect; it is between hospitalization and community
treatment-a system in which society performs its moral obligations.
The solution to those problems lies in the provision of resources in the
community to ensure decent food, clothing, shelter, and treatment services for those who need them. To the extent that severely disabled
crazy people can realize their right to "effective" liberty, they can only
do so in the community under conditions that minimize constraints on
freedom. Thus, although the scandalous condition of many disordered
persons in the community is undeniable, the conclusion sometimes
drawn-that increased utilization of involuntary hospitalization is nec173
essary-is both a breathtaking non sequitur and cynical.
A final and admittedly problematic counterpoint to the liberty argument concerns the relationship of the involuntary commitment system to the criminal justice system. Both are deviance control systems
that often deal with the same behavior. For instance, an assault, a
preference about hospitalization and treatment, however, that preference should be respected and
the guardianship should terminate.
It may be objected that this system will not work because some persons might manage to pull
themselves together for a brief moment and express a preference for treatment to cease, and then
lapse back into incoherence. The system will be inefficient and useless in such cases. In these
polar cases, this objection would be valid, but again, most cases are not polar and difficulties can
be surmounted if a rule of reasonableness is applied. Most patients will not move in and out of
incoherence so rapidly, and if they do, treatment clearly should not cease. On the other hand, the
wish of a patient who is recompensating with reasonable stability should be respected. If the
patient asks when coherent to be left alone even when incoherent, this request should also be
respected. Of course, the system will not be perfect, but it does strike a balance between liberty
and paternalism that errs, properly I believe, on the side of liberty.
171. Consider again the example, discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-29 supra, of
the heart attack victim who continues to overeat, overwork, and smoke.
172. Cf.Gruenberg & ArcherAbandonmentof Responsibilityforthe Serlously Mentally 11, 57
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q./HEALTH & SociETY 485 (1979) (society evades responsibility for
care of the mentally disordered no matter where provided). See generally Test & Stein, supra note
137.
173. See Borus, supra note 142, at 342 ("It is to be hoped that reinstitutionalization will not be
the next "new" political remedy ....").
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petty theft, or vagrancy may be seen as a misdemeanor, a symptom of
mental disorder, or both. Depending on a number of factors, a policeman may decide either to arrest the person or to take the person to a
hospital. Many people believe that if criminal conduct is a consequence of mental disorder and not too serious, it is unwise policy to use
the criminal justice system to respond to the behavior. With some
cause, they see the criminal justice system as an inefficient and cruel
institution in which to place persons who are not really responsible for
their acts and who need treatment, not punishment. If involuntary
commitment is abolished, the argument concludes, large numbers of
crazy persons will be improperly forced into the criminal justice system. As a consequence, the supposed liberty benefits provided by abolition of involuntary commitment will be undermined and the mentally
disordered will be subjected to cruel conditions.
The primary problem with this argument is that it entirely begs the
question of criminal responsibility. It assumes that the miscreant could
not have been responsible because he or she was mentally disordered.
But, as argued at great length elsewhere,' 7 4 it is fair to hold nearly all
persons, including crazy persons, responsible for their behavior. If this
is correct, then there is no reason not to use the criminal law to control
criminal deviance. People can be both mad and bad. And to the extent
they are bad, they deserve to be punished, especially if it appears possible that treating people as responsible encourages them to take responsibility for themselves. Further, the counterclaims, first, that the
criminal sanction, including jail terms, cannot deter disordered persons
because their crime is a product of disorder and, second, that hospitalization will more effectively reduce criminal recidivism among the mentally disordered, are simply unproven assertions.
The goal of providing treatment for mentally disordered persons
who commit a crime should not preclude use of the criminal justice
system. If treatment, such as drugs or psychotherapy, is required, it can
be provided in jails; hospitals provide very little that is necessarily
unique to them. Although it is unlikely that jails will provide treatment
services equal to those available in hospitals, it is equally unlikely that
many petty, disordered criminals will spend much time in jail. In any
in jails are often inexcusably
event, the treatment services available
175
improved.
vastly
be
should
poor and
To the extent that the criminalization problem is created by putting mentally disordered persons in inhumane jails for minor crimes
174. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology- A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1247, 1250-54 (1976); Morse, supra note 23, at 560-90.
175. U.S. General Accounting Office, Jail Inmates' Mental Health Care Neglected: State and
Federal Attention Needed (1980).
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such as vagrancy, perhaps the solution is to abolish such crimes and to
improve the jails, not to maintain hospitals so that jail can be avoided
by perpetrators of such arguably unnecessary crimes. Of course, vagrancy and like crimes may remain on the books, but reform in one
area cannot always await reforms in other areas. To require thorough
reform of a system before allowing reform of any one part is to prevent
any reform at all.
If involuntary commitment is abolished, there may well be an increase in the processing of cases of relatively mild deviance through the
criminal justice system and increased numbers of crazy persons may
spend some time in unpleasant and often terrible jails.176 But, if crazy
persons are almost always responsible for their behavior, and if incarceration in a jail is justified, there is no reason why they should not go
to jail. This outcome is in fact more respectful of the dignity and autonomy of crazy persons than assuming that they are nonresponsible
and must be "fixed." Jails and locked hospitals are both massive intrusions on liberty. The best response to the argument that jails are bad
places, as they surely are for noncrazy and crazy inmates alike, is to
clean them up. Using unjustified hospitalization-merely another form
of incarceration that offers little if any of the benefits it promises-to
avoid jails is not a sensible solution to the problems of criminal justice;
it merely allows us to avoid those problems.
In sum, abolition of involuntary commitment would be a positive
contribution to the climate of freedom in our society. The promised
workability and benefits of the involuntary commitment system are, for
the most part, illusory; the actual harm likely to flow from its abolition
is small.'7 7 If involuntary commitment is abolished, the mentally disordered will no longer be subject to special restraints on their right to
physical liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and other
fundamental rights. Although involuntary commitment may prevent
harm in a few cases, our society should be willing to allow some preventable harms in order to increase the liberty of its citizens.
B.

Benefts to Mental Health Professionals

Mental health professionals would benefit enormously from the
abolition of involuntary commitment. First, abolition would clearly reduce the role confusion and waste of resources engendered by professionals acting as both healers and agents of social control. Second, if
the involuntary aspects of mental health practice were abolished, the
176. Dickey, supra note 60, at 30, 36; ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY
(1969-1971) at 185-88 (1972).
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177. Test & Stein, supra note 142, at 409; Panel Report, 5 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 7, 22-25 (1977).
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tensions, discomforts, and waste of resources created by legal regulation of the practice would be greatly reduced.
There would seem to be little reason for mental health professionals to assume the role of agents of social control. If involuntary com-

mitment and treatment were abolished, mental health professionals
would still be faced with more voluntary patients than they could treat

adequately. It may reasonably be estimated that roughly five million
persons in our society suffer from severe mental disorders (somewhat
over two million of whom are chronically and severely disabled) and
could benefit from treatment. 17 8 If all "pedigreed" mental health professionals (psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric social workers, psychiatric nurses) were to ignore all other client populations and treat
only severely disordered persons, there would still be far too few pro-

fessionals to provide even moderately good treatment to all the members of that group.' 7 9 Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
178. It is virtually impossible to obtain precise figures on these questions. The five million
figure is calculated on the basis of: (1) estimates that there are approximately two million
schizophrenics in the U.S., Report of the Task Pane on the Nature and Scope of the Problems, in 2
TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, app.
at 19 (1978); (2) estimates that the prevalence rate for the clinical depression syndrome is 6.9% of
the population and the prevalence rate for bipolar affective disorder is 0.3-1.2%. Id. app. at 22-23.
Assuming that this is a total prevalence of about 7.5% for affective disorders, then approximately
17 million Americans suffer from such disorders. I am then estimating, conservatively I believe,
that at any one time 10-20% of such persons are severely disordered. This adds approximately
another two million persons to the estimate; (3) I am assuming that persons with severe mental
health consequences of organic brain syndrome (unrelated to alcohol and drug use) and alcohol
and drug use comprise at least one million more people-a conservative estimate. Thus a total of
five million is reached.
The figure in the text of somewhat over two million chronically, severely disordered persons
is taken from Talbott, The NationalPlanfor the ChronicallyMentally 1/- .4 Programmatic4nalys.r, 32 Hosp. & CoMM. PSyCHiAT. 699, 700 (1981). Talbott estimates that 2.4 million people are
moderately to severely disabled and that 1.7 million are chronically severely disabled (ofthese, 4%
are children). Talbott properly assumes that all these people need services. Id. It should be
added that Talbott estimates that there are only three million people who are severely disordered,
but I believe his figures are unduly conservative.
179. For example, there are approximately 33,000 psychiatrists and probably another 24,000
clinical psychologists in the country-a total of approximately 57,000 primary care givers. Brief
Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association, supra note 91, at 3 (psychiatrists);
Dorken & Webb, Licensed Psychologists on Increase-1974-79, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 1419 (1981)
(psychologists). If these professionals were to turn their full attention to treating only the severely
ill and were to cease treating all other disordered persons or to perform any other roles in addition
to treatment (e.g., teaching, research, supervising trainees, administration), each professional
would have over fifty patients. Put another way, if there are three million severely disordered
persons in our society (the most conservative estimate), each would receive less than one hour per
week of attention from the most trained professionals (calculated on the basis of a 50 hour work
week). Moreover, if we assume, as do many psychiatrists, that specifically psychiatric treatment is
necessary for the most disordered, then each patient would receive only about one-half hour of
treatment per week from a psychiatrist. And, of course, these figures are obviously absurd and
unrealistically optimistic because all psychiatrists and psychologists (and other professionals) will
not behave as assumed hypothetically in this note, and our society will insist on mental health
service for the far greater number of citizens who suffer from less severe mental disorders.
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within the group of severely disordered persons, the subgroup that
would consent to efficacious and humane services is still larger than
could reasonably be treated given current mental health resources.
Therefore, one must ask why mental health professionals want to confine and treat some severely disordered persons involuntarily when
there are insufficient professionals and resources to treat adequately
those severely disordered persons who would want services. The question becomes even more difficult to answer when one considers that
their role in the current commitment system as agents of social control
is antithetical to their professional desires and training. 80°
A first answer often given is that there are dangerous people who
need to be confined for the protection of others. Why, then, should we
not turn this task over to the criminal justice system as Drs. Stone and
Roth, for example, have suggested? Social control of truly dangerous
people should be left to the institutions expert at dealing
with such
i 81
problems-the police and the criminal justice system.
Another response is that some disordered persons are dangerous to
themselves and would be abandoned to preventable suffering and degradation (and perhaps even death) if society did not intervene. This is
perhaps true, but in the context of severely limited resources, time spent
treating involuntary patients is time spent not treating patients who
want services and who will face equally preventable harms. If only a
limited amount of suffering, degradation, and other harms can be prevented, why not help those who want help? The maximum amount of
care and prevention would still be offered and all the ancillary costs
created by the involuntary system would be avoided.
Healing is a goal that is, and should be, distinct from social control. The former is benign and seeks to help needy individuals. The
latter is punitive in effect and seeks to protect society at the individual's
expense. The business of mental health professionals should be to give
care, comfort, and treatment to disordered, disabled persons who seek
their help. When mental health professionals are asked to decide who
should be locked up or to ensure that those who are locked up remain
incarcerated, they are asked to perform functions for which they lack
the training and the desire. They are trained to treat patients, not to
house inmates. If treatment services were fully voluntary, professionals
could devote their full time to doing what they are trained for and de180. The noted forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Seymour Halleck of the University of North Carolina, has suggested that psychiatric residents and new psychiatrists should not be allowed to participate in the involuntary commitment process because it corrupts them. Remarks to the

Audience at the 6th International Symposium on Law and Psychiatry, Charlottesville, Va., June
13, 1981. Dr. Halleck also suggested that at least some psychiatrists enjoy their power in the
involuntary commitment system and would be loathe to give it up.
181. A. STONE, supra note 43, at 37, 192-94; Roth, supra note 145, at 1126.
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sire to do--caring for and treating suffering persons who want help.
Moreover, they would no longer be forced into the onerous role of coercive control agents whose interests are at least in part opposed to
those of their patients.
Abolition would also address the somewhat justified complaints of
mental health professionals about the legalization of their practices.
Mental health professionals charge that legalization intrudes unduly on
professional prerogatives and makes the provision of adequate mental
health care almost impossible. 8 2 Some critics of legalization fail to
recognize three important points, however. First, legal reform was, in
part, a response to documented medical and legal abuses; there is little
reason to believe such abuses would not recur if the fetters of legalization were removed. Second, in our society, legal regulation of a system
that leads to such an extensive deprivation of liberty is unavoidable.
Legalization clearly intrudes on mental health practice, but it is absolutely necessary to protect the rights of patients who may be incarcerated and treated involuntarily. Third and most important, proponents
of involuntary hospitalization fail to recognize that if the involuntary
aspects of mental health practice were abolished, most of the intrusive
fetters of legalization also would be abolished. Court hearings and
other legal second-guessings about decisions to hospitalize and treat a
person are necessary only if these decisions are made against the will of
the patient. If psychiatric services were voluntary, their regulation, like
regulation of most medical practice, could be left to internal professional review and suits for malpractice.
In addition to removing the shackles of legal regulation, abolition
would also help remove mental health professionals from the role of
courtroom experts, a role ill-suited to their training and societal
needs.' 83 Civil commitment hearings generally require expert testimony from mental health professionals, who are often given the de
facto power to decide the ultimate legal issue of whether a person
should be involuntarily incarcerated in a mental hospital.184 Of course,
182. A. Stone, supra note 127, at 29-3 1, has provided an enormously amusing if somewhat
inapt scenario describing this argument. In the scenario, lawyers are asked to imagine the impact

on their practices of oversight and constant intrusion by psychiatric advocates. Dr. Stone recognizes, however, that unfettered medical discretion led to abuses. A. STONE, supra note 43, at I.
183. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 64, at 734-43; Morse, supra note 23, at 625. See generally J.
ZISKIN, supra note 75.
184. See Cohen, The Function ofthe Attorney and the Commitment ofthe Mentally111, 44 TEx.
L. REv. 424, 428-30 (1966); Fein & Miller, Legal Processes andAdudication in MentalIncompetency Proceedings, 20 Soc. PRoB. 57, 63 (1972); Scheff, Social Conditions/orRationality: How
UrbanandRuralCourtsDeal with the Mentally 111, AM. BEiAv. SCIENTIST, Mar. 1964, at 21; Stier
& Stoebe, supra note 78, at 1353; Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counselon Admissions to
a State Mental Hospital-A ConfrontationofProfessions, 10 J. OF HEALTH & HuMAN BEHAVIOR
66 (1969); Wexler, The Administration ofPsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein Arizona, 13
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such professionals are not legal, moral, or social experts and thus are
being asked to decide questions beyond their competence.
Although the problem of professionals' testimony becoming dispositive can, to a large degree, be prevented by asking experts the right
questions and by not allowing them to testify on ultimate legal issues,'8 5 there would still be a significant inefficiency inherent in the system. Expert testimony and the examinations upon which it is based
require the expenditure of much professional time that would be better
spent providing therapeutic services.' 8 6 When a psychiatrist or psychologist from an understaffed state hospital must spend a morning in
court, many hours of treatment expertise are wasted to the detriment of
patients, with little consequent benefit to society or to the person involuntarily committed. Moreover, since anything less than complete and
competent expert testimony would fail to provide the factfinder with
the information necessary for a full and fair hearing, this problem cannot be remedied by reducing the time spent by mental health professionals in commitment hearings.
Abolition of involuntary commitment would thus seem to be in the
self-interest of mental health professionals. Not only would they be
able to avoid practicing in the shackles of the legal system, but they
would be able to spend their time using their talents in the most productive way-helping patients who want to be helped.
C

The Enhancement of Treatment

As a matter of well-grounded speculation, it can be expected that
treatment in general will be enhanced if it is offered voluntarily. This
point seems to be generally recognized, as evidenced by the clear preference nationwide for voluntary services.' 87 If the treating professional
is entirely the patient's agent and is not perceived also as an agent of
the state, the therapeutic alliance and the ameliorative influence of the
therapist's authority will surely be strengthened. If treatments are offered in a respectful and caring fashion and the benefits and costs are
ARIz. L. REV. I, 60 & n.195 (1971). But see Hiday, Court Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference?, 4 INT. J. L. & PSYCHIAT. 159 (1981).

185. A complete argument concerning this proposition is presented in Morse, supra note 23,
at 600-04; see also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 454-57 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (insanity
defense cases).
186. Shwed, Protectingthe Rights of the Mentally 111, 64 A.B.A.J. 564, 567 (1978); Slovenko,
CriminalJustice Proceduresin Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 35 (1977).
187. Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West 1972 & Supp.
1980); Wexler, Foreword-MentalHealth Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62
CALiF. L. REV. 671, 675-92 (1974); cf. Steinglass, Grantham & Hertzman, Predicting Which Patients Ifqll Be DischargedAgainst Medical Advice: A Pilot Study, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1385
(1980) (differences between patients and treatment staff as to nature of "therapeutic contract" is

valid predictor of which patients will eventually be discharged against medical advice).
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explained clearly and patiently to the disordered person, one can expect
much less resistance to treatment and the optimum chance for therapeutic gain. This type of behavior may take a lot of time, but it is
nothing more than the preferred, traditional, voluntary, contractual
mode of treatment initiation. Furthermore, as already discussed, instituting such a voluntary scheme would also result in a more efficient
allocation of mental health resources, t88 which in itself should lead to
better overall mental health care.
D.

Cost Savings

A final benefit of abolition will be the freeing of the resources now
spent on unnecessary hospitalization, custodial care, and the legal apparatus necessary to ensure the minimal fairness of the system. It has
already been noted that custodial hospitalization is terribly expensive
and wasteful and that most needed mental health treatment and services can be provided effectively and cheaply on an outpatient basis.' 89
If involuntary commitment were abolished, the funds formerly spent
on the commitment system could be used to enhance community services so that they could reach a greater number of needy citizens at a
higher level of quality.
It may be contended that deinstitutionalization will not be cheaper
if it is accomplished properly, given the substantial cost of community
treatments and the increase in their utilization that might be expected.
Mental health treatment is undeniably expensive, but per patient it is
cheaper in the community than when involuntary hospitalization is employed.' 90 Furthermore, if increased utilization is the result of offering
quality treatment in the community on a voluntary basis, that should
be seen as a factor in its favor rather than as a reason for decreasing
community services and increasing involuntary hospitalization.
Involuntary commitment provides few people with few benefits at
great cost. Abolition would make possible the treatment, under conditions of freedom, of greater numbers with greater benefit.
CONCLUSION
"LEGALIZATION"

AND THE FUTURE OF INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT

For the past two decades, lawyers, some mental health professionals and others interested in liberty and humane treatment for mentally
188. See text accompanying notes 178-86 supra.
189. Chambers, supra note 137, at 1121-37; sources cited at notes 137 & 142 supra. But see

Letter from M. Sills to the Editor, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH1AT. 599 (1981).
190. E.g., Murphy & Datel, A Cost-BenfitAnalysis of Community Versus InstitutionalLiving,

27 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIAT. 105 (1976).
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disordered persons have litigated and lobbied ceaselessly to restrict the
criteria for involuntary commitment, to promote deinstitutionalization
and other alternatives to involuntary incarceration, to increase the procedural protections accorded to those in danger of commitment, and to

expand the civil liberties of patients and ex-patients. The result has
been a cascade of litigation and legislation that has "legalized" the

commitment process and, consequently, has done much to further the
described goals of the patients' rights advocates.191 That this legaliza-

tion has done some good and that patients should have rights (at least

in theory) nearly all will admit.192 But, it is countered, the process has
nonetheless gone too far.'9 3

The argument that legalization has gone too far or has caused
more problems than it has solved is entirely incorrect. Before the inter-

ventions of the patients' advocates, patients had almost no rights in
practice and most commitments involved little more than warehousing
under often brutal conditions. One must constantly remember that the
right to treatment and right to rehabilitation suits that exposed the utterly shocking and inhumane conditions in state hospitals in various

states 194 were products of the 1970's, not the distant past. There is little
if any indication that, in general, patients were obtaining rights or decent care and treatment prior to the legalization movement. This is not
to claim that legalization has been a panacea; indeed, vast problems
remain. 95 Nor can it be denied that undertrained or overzealous advocates may have overstepped their bounds and disrupted programs in
some instances. 196 Patients are still overcommitted, however, and the
191. See Schwitzgebel, supra note 5, at 53.
192. See.L. Kahle & B. Sales, Due ProcessofLaw and the Attitudes ofrofessionals Toward
Involuntary Civil Commitment, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 265 (P. Lipsitt
& B. Sales eds. 1979).
193. Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 23.
194. E.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
451 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1978), modfied, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'dand remanded, 101 S.
Ct. 1531 (1981); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced by 344 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aJJ'din
part,rev'd and remandedinpart on othergroundssub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th

Cir. 1974).
195. See Dickey, supra note 60, at 22-40; Stier & Stoebe, supra note 78, at 1284-435; sources
cited in notes 132 & 143 supra.
196. Brakel, supra note 193, at 74-77. It should be pointed out, however, that some disruption
is the inevitable product of a system that exists in tension between liberty and paternalism and
that allows advocates to help patients. Disruption could be minimized, however, by various procedural innovations. For instance, if the conditions of confinement, including the provision of
involuntary treatment, were adjudicated and ordered at the initial commitment hearing, conflict
within the hospital might be lessened and would arise mainly if there was a substantial deterioration in the patient's condition or if the hospital failed to provide the requisite rights and care to the
patient.
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conditions of confinement and the treatment they receive still fall far
short of what is acceptable.
Legalization has not gone too far-it has not gone far enough. Society and the mental health professions have not been willing on their
own initiative to provide sufficient services to needy, mentally disordered citizens. Legalization's continued intrusion on mental health
care would be unnecessary if society cared for its chronically disabled
citizens and if the mental health professions were willing to put their
houses in order. Since neither of these conditions obtains, it is the duty
of legalization proponents to seek to limit current involuntary commitment, to make it more humane, and ultimately, one hopes, to contribute to its abolition.
Many will argue in response to the argument in favor of abolition
(or restriction) that mental, disorder and the social and familial
problems it causes cannot be abolished. Moreover, they will predict
that disordered persons will live in the community, as many do now, in
a state of misery and degradation. The first point cannot be gainsaid:
mental disorder-whether it is conceptualized as disease or deviant
conduct or whatever-and its consequences will continue. It is also
true that the conditions under which many disordered persons now live
in the community are repulsive and a moral disgrace to our society.
These problems require attention. However, maintaining involuntary
hospitalization is not the answer. The system, as now constituted, does
not alleviate substantially the ills of the disordered; rather, it only
removes disordered persons and their problems from the consciousness
and conscience of our society at an enormous cost in liberty. If there is
a solution, however partial, it lies in providing the resources to ensure
that decent food, shelter, clothing, and treatment are provided in the
community in the least restrictive manner to those who need them.
The legalization movement is forcing society and the mental
health professions to come to terms with what it is willing to do for and
to its most disordered citizens. Do we mean to treat and cure people, or
do we mean to cast them out and warehouse them? The movement has
been successful because it has exposed the unfulfilled promises and the
cant of the involuntary commitment system. However reasonable an
involuntary commitment system may seem in theory, past experience
demonstrates that the system does not and cannot work.
Despite all this, the arguments in favor of involuntary commitment retain a seductive appeal that will probably prevent its abolition
in the near future. Much of this appeal is predicated on a vision of
mental health care in state hospitals that can only be described as
mythical. Relatively pleasant hospitals are envisioned, with reasonably
sufficient and competent staff who form caring relationships with most
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patients and who deliver quality treatments offering patients a reasonable possibility of cure. When a court or legislature succumbs to this
vision, setbacks to legalization can occur. But to succumb to this vision
is to ignore the harsh reality of commitment. If society never faces the
reality, there will be cycles of greater and lesser civil rights for patients,
but involuntary commitment97 and its consequent substandard care for
the disordered will remain.'

A false vision of the quality of care provided by involuntary commitment is not all that may thwart the legalization process. As legalization continues, society may become unwilling to pay the price in terms
of caring and tolerance. Moreover, the material outlays necessary for
proper treatment have not been, and probably will not be, forthcoming.
Persons who are concerned with treating disordered persons with dignity and humanity must combat these problems and should strive to
abolish, or at least severely restrict, involuntary commitment and to
encourage the provision of adequate care in the community.
If care and treatment services are voluntary and reasonably provided to disordered persons and if social control is left primarily to the
criminal justice system, our society, the mentally disordered, and even
the mental health professions will be benefitted. Hospitals will still exist: some people will want treatment there and perhaps some can
best-or only-be treated in such an environment. A vast number of
citizens, however, will for the first time be able to obtain needed services in an atmosphere of dignity and liberty. Professionals will be freed
to devote their full time to the tasks of diagnosis and treatment for
which they are truly trained. There will be more than enough work,
prestige, and power for mental health professionals who treat only willing patients. Of course, if involuntary incarceration in a hospital is not
available, disordered citizens may, on occasion, seriously endanger
themselves or others; no public policy, no matter how beneficial, is entirely cost free. Nonetheless, if the social climate of liberty is increased
and if mentally disordered persons are finally treated as dignified and
autonomous human beings, then abolition of the involuntary commitment system is well worth any costs that are likely to result.

197. See generally Gruenberg & Archer, supra note 172; Lamb, Roots ofNeglect of the LongTerm Mentally Ill, 42 PSYCHIAT. 201 (1979).

